O método anticartesiano de C. S. Peirce (Portuguese Edition)

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This semiotic change is due to the short lived impact of indexicality as a form of popular entertainment, and to the long lasting effect of sit-com conventions and visual strategies. Thus self-reference is used by two varieties of indexical genre for different purposes: consciousness raising documentary , and new ways of turning everyday life interaction into humorous sketches BBB. Different purposes are accomplished by a similar self-referential strategy. Changing and developing in the flux of time, they are no more what they used to be in a former stage of our life.

Therefore they form part of an expanding culture of memory, with aspects of musealization and nostalgia, which can be regarded as a counterpart to the process of modernization. This nostalgia of the media does not only extend to the material remains media archives, personal collections etc.

Media do increasingly devote themselves to this nostalgia of the media, which means that they rely to different historic versions of themselves resp. Therefore nostalgia of the media in the media is a way of self-reference of the media, because media refer to themselves as subject to historic development, remembrance, oblivion, destruction etc. The paper will focus on examples that show nostalgia of film and tv in film.

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Nina Bishara: "Absolut Anonymous". Self-Reference and Opaque Advertising Advertising is essentially a means to an end but never an end in itself. It refers to a product, which is the object of a sign. This kind of reference is highly indexical in the sense of Peirce. Occasionally, advertising appears on its surface to be self-referential, that is, it seems to point to itself and not to the product.

This does not only constitute a paradox, it also seems counterproductive to the primary aims of the text genre. One of the forms of self-reference in advertising is the topic of this paper: opaque advertising. It consists of seemingly empty indices and invisible referents. These enigmatic advertising texts remain self-referential as long as the recipients do not succeed in determining a referential object or interpretant with the help of clues provided by the advertisers.

Therefore, opaque advertising is ultimately only seemingly self-referential as the invisible referent is actually transparent in the advertising message. The function of enigmatic advertising is to increase the readers' time dedicated to the text and thus increase the memo value of the advertising message.

Forms and Function of Archive Material in the presentation of Television history in television The visualization of history is one of the strength of television in its ongoing competition with the existing media ensemble. During the historic development of television documentaries established themselves as dominating formats of the visualization of history. But since a few years diverse showformats of historytainment like "The Castle" Pro Sieben play an important role in german television programs.

Fragments of Archive material are used to deliver nostalgic experiences to the audiences like in shows about the history of the GDR. This lecture is analyzing the special usage of archive Material in the visual presentation of television history in television. On this basis it is possible to reflect about the self presentation of television as well as about the role of television in the collective memory of society.

Vincent Colapietro: Distortion, Fabrication, and Disclosure in a Self-Referential Culture: The Irrepressible Force of Reality The news being broadcast via such media as television, radio, and the world wide web constitutes unquestionably intricate and arguably insular networks of self-citation and self-commentary. The news reports on the news as much as anything else. Popular entertainment constructs a world of complex allusions to the fabrications of the entertainment industry itself.

Nowhere is intertextuality more evident than, for example, in the narrative, characteriological, imagistic, and musical structures of cinema. We seemingly inhabit a world of our own making, one in which claims about reality are viewed with deep suspicion, if not outright dismissal. The crisis of representation, insofar as it is generated by the inherent dynamic of, and theoretical reflections on, mass media, is inseparably connected to the forms of reflexivity so pervasive in a culture so radically structured by such media: the possibilities of reference and representation seem to be limited to those of self-reference and self-representation.

The mediated or semiotic realism of C. Peirce is however able to do fuller justice to the complex actualities of contemporary culture than more influential theories of radical constructivism. For theoretical and practical purposes, the language of disclosure must not be completely jettisoned in favor of the language of distortion or that of fabrication or construction.

The purpose of this paper is to make this argument as briefly and yet pointedly as possible. Those who play are permanently emitting signals, which refer to the situation and denote it as play. Such signals change the meaning of all actions within the situation. For example, what seems to be pursuit, attack, or business, changes to "only play" or "just for fun. Playful actions mimic actions, but at the same time, deny the meaning of the mimicked actions.

The self-referential message "This is play", included by all playful actions, is constitutive for the play-situation: if play is not signified as play it is not play. Proceeding from an elaboration of Bateson's theory, the paper will consider the possibility of its application on games, focusing on forms that are used by single player computer games to include metacommunication in the gaming process. These games, due to the lack of communication and communication partners, either fictionalize the act of metacommunication or establish a situation of parasocial interaction a concept derived from TV-theory to describe programs that simulate direct address of the spectators.

Analyses of exemplary computer games will illustrate the theoretical premises. The metaphor refers to the end of a medium whose messages were indexical signs causally related to the objects they refer to, a medium about which R. Barthes has said that "it never lies. However, if the loss of the referent is the distinctive feature of traditional photography, the "death of photography" is as old as the "crisis of representation," and the history of photography has seen many forms and modalities of this death, e.

Published on Oct 2, Thispaperpresentsaconceptualanalysisstudyofthesocialmediasin its interactive communication context. The proposal starts from the systemic context of these mediatic processes and the proposition of the analysis parameters reasoned by the peircean phenomenology. Thus the objective is presenting a way of the systemic and phenomenological study to understand the modes of informational exchanges occurrence and the complex relationships that establishes in the dynamic contexts of social media, based on the analysis of three parameters: emergence, circumstance, movement.

These parameters are therefore understood as essential conditions to clarify languages, contexts and processes inherent to digital social networks in the internet. The proposal is understanding under the phenomenological point of view, how signs in this context can be presented, how they behave in their different systemic contexts - socio-cultural, technological, graphics - and how the mediatics evolutionary processes in social networks tends to occur.

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What Distinguishes a Person from a Word? C. S. Peirce's Thought

Social media contest - Advantages a Embed Size px. Start on. Show related SlideShares at end. WordPress Shortcode. Published in: Internet. Full Name Comment goes here. Are you sure you want to Yes No. Twila Barlow It's been ten months without a yeast infection. More than that, for the past couple of months I only had one migraine attack, comparing to six a week as I used to.

I also very often suffered from runny nose and acne on my forehead. Since I started your program, it's been like a miracle. My acne disappeared in less than 2 weeks, I lost 10 pounds, and the flu like symptoms I often use to suffer from are also a thing of the past. I feel so young and empowered and I would have never believed there was a natural solution for my problems, if I was told a year ago. I wish everybody knew about this method. There are so many hopeless women and men out there with candida yeast infections. A compilation of texts from very different sources and periods shows — as it could be expected when we talk about Peirce — a theory in constant evolution.

There was not a single time in which, while working on his semiotic, Peirce failed to introduce new terms and interpretations. Besides that, in his large philosophical architecture, semiotic works like an amalgam capable of unifying several disciplines. It is mentioned and discussed in articles and letters about subjects as different as logic, mathematic and metaphysics.

Peirce felt the obvious necessity of adapting the terminology and the notation according to the canons accepted by each of these sciences. Murphey , p. Short affirms that Peirce abandoned many of his juvenile ideas. Savan , p. It is necessary, thus, to know a little about how these changes may have happened.

This last one is an important logical problem, for the truth of any proposition analyzed depends on it. Throughout his intellectual life, Peirce tried to study this matter under all the possible points of view. He extracted lessons from philosophical texts since antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle, going through medieval ones up to his contemporaries of the 19 th century.

This brochure is normally referred as Syllabus among the scholars, many of whom consider it the most finished version of his semiotic. In its pages appears the famous inverted triangle with ten genuine classes of signs created from three triadic divisions or trichotomies. This is the classification found in most manuals and articles on Peircean semiotic. However, Peirce never considered the version published in the Syllabus the final word on the problem of classification of signs.

As we will see shortly, the classification, although important, represented the beginning of a new round of creative revisions of his semiotic, which went through the years of and and, actually, never ended. The number of trichotomies, which in the Syllabus was only three, from on came to be ten, with the daunting perspective that the classes of signs could be counted by thousands.

Between and , Peirce had taken his semiotic to such new directions in comparison with the past ones that the classification of the Syllabus was not even considered by him a starting point for his new classificatory exercises. Synthesis of traditions Peirce derived his conceptions of semiotic as logic probably from the reading of the British empiricist philosophers. In fact, Locke had already affirmed in the necessity of a new type of logic, which he named Semeiotic, explaining that it should be a doctrine about the signs the mind makes use for the understanding of things.

Still in the British tradition, Peirce received an influence from the logic of Mill, as well as from the writings of Hamilton. The empiric tradition usual to the British philosophers emphasized the importance of the inductive inference and the related concepts of connotation the predicable qualities of a term and denotation the things to which a term is applied as 31fundamental to logic. Nevertheless, Peirce already writes in his first articles that these two quantities could handle a central phenomenon in logic, which is the growth or evolution of the meaning of terms and propositions.

Information is an idealistic component launched in the interior of the empiricist logic and its introduction would have important consequences for the future of his Theory of the Signs, mainly in his mature phase, when it embraced the reality of Thirdness. On the one hand, this concern drove him into the scholastic philosophy, where he tried to find the roots of the two traditions he had strived to unify.

From the reading of Occam and Scotus, for example, Peirce reached the doctrine of signs devised by the stoics and, more importantly, the definition of the material implication accredited to Filo de Megara. On the other hand, this search for a philosophical synthesis made him read the greatest names of German school, as the transcendentalist Kant, the mathematical philosopher Leibniz and the idealists Hegel e Schilling Esposito, , L1. Peirce also studied intensively the zoologic classification performed by Agassiz, of whom he was a direct 32student in his youth Esposito, , L1.

All this contact with empirical methods supplied ideas he would use and adapt when developing his semiotic. Soon Peirce concluded that science should start with a genuine effort to reveal and cast the natural classes given to direct observation — i. Having identified and defined the classes by their typology, science should then proceed to their proper classification, i.

This procedure should produce an architectonic classification of all the possible sciences current and future , wherein the most abstract, as mathematic, should offer subsidies to the most empirical ones. The primacy of mathematic in the classificatory construction of sciences, as well as its role as provider of subsidies to the other sciences, instigated Peirce to maintain a restless research about the foundations of mathematic and its relation with other sciences, mostly with logic.

It comes from mathematic, for instance, his terminology about the three categories Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. From his study about the relation between logic and mathematic, Peirce developed an algebraic logic independently from Frege. He also produced an axiomatization of natural numbers, and studied in detail the postulates and theorems of the Euclidian geometry, as well as the consequences of the new geometries proposed by Riemann e Lobatchevski.

These studies also led him to research the notion of relation, of infinite and of continuum that he tried to apply to a special type of topology closely related to his semiotic and his graphical logic. In his first attempts to classify the sciences, logic appeared as a subordinate ramification of semiotic. While the latter regards the signs in general, the former would be responsible for focusing its attention only on the symbols and the logic figures directly related to them, such as the term, the proposition and the argument this last one also called syllogism or inference.

Later, however, Peirce started to consider semiotic and logic as synonyms Houser, , p. The second ramification is Critical Logic, considered by him as the science about the truth of representations, i. Finally, Peirce conceived the Speculative Rhetoric also methodeutic or communication as the third ramification of semiotic, defining it as the study of the effects produced by the action of the sign on its interpretants.

It is under the point of view of Rhetoric that semiosis can be seen as communication oriented to a purpose. In his maturity, Peirce will emphasize that semiosis is not restricted to human minds but happens also in naturalized quasi-minds. It follows that communication is not necessarily intellectual, but can be considered an ontological process that produces the communion of minds of each person with the others and of all minds with the totality of a universal quasi-mind cf.

Murphey, , p. It is specially interesting to follow up how semiotic, although initially used by Peirce as an instrument of proof for his pragmatic method, grows slowly in importance to comprise the action of the sign in all possible instances of reality and not only in the clarification of concepts, as originally proposed by Pragmatism Houser, , p. Let us see briefly how this evolution occurred. First phase: to The triadic sign and the denial of the Cartesian intuition Peirce starts to develop his theory of Sign already in the first articles published by him, between and There Peirce revises the table of categories of both Aristotle and Kant, exposing for the first time his tripartite ontology.

In these texts, he develops his concern about the origin of knowledge in our minds presenting an alternative for Cartesian gnosiology. Peirce strongly refutes the idea that knowledge is grounded on an artificial doubt, as it is the case of the Cogito. Contrary to Descartes, he defends that inquiry must begin with a genuine doubt, and that we must seek its answer not getting rid of pre-concepts but trying to correct and refine them throughout the process of inquiry. The dispute between nominalism and realism is the background of these texts.

It may be put this way: is an idea a mere creation of our minds in order to give sense to the multitude of impressions, or does this idea really exist in the world and what we do is try to apprehend it the best we can with the limited powers of our intellect? Roughly speaking, whoever believes that the concepts are just names created by our minds to subsume the sense impressions is a nominalist.

The realist, on the other hand, believes that general ideas, or universals, are in some way present in the reality, acting independently of whatever we may think of them. If nominalism is correct, Peirce argues, we are condemned to individualism, for each one of us will develop his own conceptions about the world; but if realism is correct, only the union of efforts of all intelligent minds may be able to form a true concept about reality.

Nominalism leads to solipsism, but realism opens the doors to pragmatism as a method to clarify the ideas in the search for Truth. The fact that Peirce had abandoned nominalism does not mean that he had become anti-idealist, however. As noticed when we mentioned his concept of information, while Peirce should be considered a realist regarding logic, he also proclaimed to believe in a kind of objective idealism when he talked about metaphysic. That is why some commentators prefer to say that Peirce developed a sort of sui generis idealism-realism.

In the New List, the element that condenses the knowledge about the world is the representation — a mental manifestation that bridges between the world and the intellect. It all starts, Peirce describes, with the synthesis of the senses impressions, where the mind creates ideas or general concepts through a process of comparison. Peirce proposes that two major groups divide the categories present a priori in the mind during this task: Being and Substance.

While Substance remains as something uncognizable, in the Kantian transcendental sense, Being manifests itself to mind in the three ways that reflect the three possible types of comparison: quality when related to a ground , relation when related to a correlate and finally representation when related to an interpretant. Afterwards, Peirce applies a similar trichotomy to representation, originating what he called at that time Resemblances later Icons , Indexes and Symbols. There is, as we see, a triadic and indecomposable relation in the production of a sign: significance does not occur in the relation between the sign and its object only, as the majority of the previous theories of the signs affirmed, but it demands a third correlate.

This new element is the interpretant, seen as the effect produced in the mind by the sign and, therefore, another sign. At this time, it must be clear, Peirce still saw representation as restricted to thought — a kind of internalized discourse inside the mind, based only on general concepts and very similar to the functioning of language Short, , p. The central purpose of these articles is to defend the idea that human cognition is a dynamic process that does start with an artificial doubt, as proposed by Descartes, but happens in media res.

We should start the inquiry with our preconceptions or imperfect ideas and only slowly, by a continuous process of inferences, improve them in the direction of Truth. Using hypothesis and their empirical tests against reality, we should be able to produce an argumentation not concatenated as a chain that cannot be stronger than its weakest link , but weaved like a cable made of thin and subtle fibers, provided they are so numerous and intimately connected to guarantee its strength. They all blend with each other the same way dots merge to create a line.

A thought is a sign that represents a previous thought, which assumes the role of its object, and is interpreted by a subsequent thought, which assumes the role of its interpretant — and so on ad infinitum Short, , p. This mental semiosis assumes a fundamental role in the pragmatic search for Truth, which is expected as the result of the whole process. Although this is an infinite series, semiosis does not have to drag out forever because the inferences occur at infinitesimal intervals, which are agglutinated through the schema of time.

Peirce resorts to the paradox of Zeno describing the race between Achilles and the tortoise to show that the idea of an infinite series of interpretants does not imply endless semiosis. As much as Achilles will eventually reach the tortoise, the infinite series of inferences will produce a cognitive result. For example, the realism of this period still lacked a clear notion of Secondness as the expression of a reality that exists outside mind and independent of what we think of it.

This is precisely the role the index will take in the years to come. Although Peirce had already divided the sign in Resemblances, Indexes and Symbols, they were still mental stuff. In addition, Peirce still holded that the logician should consider only the types of 37representation derived from the symbol.

This means that Peirce restricted his Pragmatism to a method to make clear concepts only, relating their meaning to the practical consequences implied in their acceptance. Besides that, he was interested in developing an algebraic logic inspired in the recent works of Boole. He started to harvest what nearly ten years of studies had produced in , when Peirce and his most brilliant student at Johns Hopkins, Oscar Mitchell, concluded that the logic needed Indexes to express the idea of quantification Short, , p. They discovered quantification independently of Frege, who had come to the same idea of quantifiers but whose work remained unknown.

These important advances led him to reformulate his philosophical system and had an important impact in semiotic too. The quantification through indexes, for example, led Peirce to recognize that the world exterior to mind possess an undeniable reality and that 38logic had to incorporate this lesson in its notational system. In another important text about the algebra of logic, published in , Peirce wrote that a complete logical notation should possess general or conventional signs symbols , quantifiers or selectives of the same nature of demonstrative pronouns indexes and signs of resemblance.

Peirce no longer considered the index a secondary element in the process of knowledge and representation. As one of these pins that we use to pinpoint an individual place on a world map board, the index selects a particular occurrence of a general concept, which then becomes the subject of a predicate. As a result, if an index is existentially connected to the subject that it denotes, then so is the proposition connected to the same subject. That means that cognitions do not have to be necessarily enchained one another, ad infinitum, but they may begin in perception.

With the new role reserved to the indexes, Peirce also refined the terminology of his semiotic. At this same time, Peirce adopted the notion of degeneration, borrowed from projective geometry, and applied it to his logic of relations. Thus, now he explained icons, indexes and symbols as derivations from three different types of relation that a Sign could have with its object, according to the theory of categories. The icon relates in a monadic manner with is object, be it by resemblance when sign and object share the same property or by exemplification when the object is a property the sign possesses.

The index presents a dyadic relation with its object, for it has a real connection with it. Only the symbol possesses a genuine triadic and, therefore, intrinsically logic relation with its object, having the power to represent it by an arbitrary convention CP 2. While the bond between semiotic and categoriology had been tightened, in , Peirce fostered a controversy against the mechanistic vision of the universe defended by Spencer cf.

According to Peirce, a purely mechanical causation, such as the dyadic cause-effect, is not able to explain the phenomena of growth and development present in the universe. The conception of final causation was the first step towards the creation of a metaphysical semiotic, which semiosis considered as the teleological movement of a reality composed by signs — a vision that would only be put into effect two decades later.

Around , Peirce affirmed that there were only three active elements in the world: first, chance; second, law; and third, habit formation. Although there was still no explicit identification among these three ontological stages and the sign trichotomies, Peirce was walking rapidly in this direction. Other important steps for the synthesis between metaphysics and semiotic occurred between and , when Peirce formulated his doctrines of tychism the existence of the absolute chance and synechism the existence of a profound connection among all things of the universe, expressed in the form of a continuum.

In its exposition of tychism, chance or spontaneity is considered a creative element of a universe conceived as living mind. Matter is nothing but effete mind, whose creative power had been attenuated by habits in the form of laws of physics CP 6. In other words, reality starts to assume a conditional mode: it is what would be revealed if all the possible efforts of inquiry were performed while pure Secondness, taken as absolute chance, keeps adding creative novelty that continuously influence the evolutionary process.

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Still between and , Peirce wrote several drafts for a chapter of a book of logic that was never completed. In these manuscripts, he showed once again the intimate relations between logic and semiotic, explicitly comparing semiosis with mental reasoning. According to Peirce, a proposition, for instance, should always contain Icons and indexes. Besides, abduction is emphasized as the only kind of reasoning capable of offering new 40knowledge and, therefore, essential for the developments of logic and sciences in general.

Peirce explains abduction as a kind of instinct based on the affinity between our mind and nature. He concludes that the logic of Pragmatism is essentially abductive, attached to non rational and probably non conscious processes of the mind. Finally, while his semiotic was continuously being enlarged to comprehend non rational phenomena, Peirce began to distinguish two senses for logic: a more traditional one, restricted to the forms of inference and their conditions of truth; and another much more comprehensive, in which he could glimpse a general Theory of Signs that exceeded the limits of traditional logic to comprise the vestibules of reason.

Third phase: to The studies of perception and the classification The third phase starts when Peirce takes a further step towards a logical realism to accept, in , the universe of the possibilities as ontologically present in the world Short, , p. In , Peirce advocates a kind of realism that resembles that of Aristotle, but with special emphasis on the haecceitas of Scotus.

Peirce now considers the three categories — possibility, reaction and mediation — as complete and irreducible, finally naming them Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, extracted from Mathematic. This new ontological vision led Peirce to retake his studies about cognition, conducted previously under strong Kantian and nominalistic influence, to present them in accordance to the new realistic clothing of his philosophy. The agitation that followed this announcement produced a double reaction in Peirce: on the one hand, he began to criticize openly and acidly all those who used the term pragmatism out of its logical range, without sparing even his friend and benefactor James, whom Peirce blamed of maculating Pragmatism with psychologisms.

On the other hand, Peirce assumed the responsibility of revising the basis of the Pragmatism, offering to this doctrine a definite 41logical proof. He hoped to accomplish that using the instruments and concepts in logic and semiotic he had implemented since the first formulation of the pragmatic maxim. However, his hope of systematizing his recent contributions was once again frustrated because he did not receive the financial support he expected to carry the project forward. While waiting for a grant that would never come, Peirce returned to his Theory of Sign in search for the desired proof of Pragmatism.

At the same time, James invited Peirce for two series of conferences to be held in one in Harvard, dedicated to Pragmatism and the other at Lowell Institute, in Cambridge, directed to logic. The consequence of this double stimulus — the search of a sound proof of Pragmatism and the preparation for the coming conferences — was a complete revision of his semiotic for it became clear to him that semiosis was linked to the laws of nature. In fact, in Peirce returned to his articles and manuscripts produced between and , most of them dedicated to the discussion of the Theory of Evolution and its relations with the laws of Physics.

Reading this old staff through the new metaphysical light, he concluded that the purpose that guides the evolution of the species and the laws of Universe cannot be based on consciousness but, on the contrary, it is consciousness that should be considered a sub-product of a telic movement towards a final purpose. This is, summing up, the Aristothelic thesis of the final cause and Peirce adopts as a fundamental component for the development of the sign, based on semiosis.

Peirce concluded that logic and semiotic should be considered synonyms for being animated by the same leading principle. Borrowing the medieval division of liberal arts in Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric, Peirce for the first time announced his famous division of Semiotic in Speculative Grammar, Critical and Speculative Rhetoric or Methodeutic. Still in the ambit of the conferences about Pragmatism scheduled for , there was the need of approaching once more the problem of the origin of knowledge.

Peirce faces it under the phenomenological point of view of perception, taking advantage of his studies in 42quantification and of the role of index in logic.

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Beginning in , but carrying on for the next four years, Peirce developed a new theory of perception, destined to conjugate his logical realism with his falibilism, and which would have its first presentation in the lectures of Harvard in March Peirce explains that our first logical premises are born from the contact with reality through the perceptive judgment. This does not mean that these judgments are inmanent intuitions about the real — which would mean his surrender to the Cartesian thesis he had so hardly combated in the articles about cognition and, therefore, fallible.

It is impossible, thus, for us to know immediately the relations among things, although we can make suppositions about them that are blindly accepted until they are discarded or reformulated by subsequent judgments. With this ingenious thesis, Peirce gives an answer to the question of the first cognitions without having to resort to the endless train of thought.

He did this without affecting his doctrine of falibilism, considered by him a fundamental pillar of Pragmatism Short, In some moment between the conference in Harvard and the writing of the Syllabus for the conferences at Lowell Institute, held in October , Peirce had an insight that led to an important change in the structure of his classification of the Signs. According to Freadman , this change is evident in the way the sign divisions complicate if we compare the ones Peirce had given before. For the first time, he presents the types of signs as composed by classes created by relations among three trichotomies.

Peirce affirms that a class of sign is a relation of three correlates. In the first one, the sign can be a monad qualisign , an object or singular event a sinsign or a type of law ruling its replicas legisign. In the second correlate, which considers the relation of the sign and its object, the sign can be one of the already known icons, indexes and symbols. Finally, in the third correlate the sign can be a rheme the generic sign for the logical terms , a dicisigns the generic for propositions or an argument the generic for syllogisms or inferences.

Following an order of material implication, wherein the first correlate determines the third by means of the second, Peirce comes then to ten classes of signs that he calls genuine and classify distributing them in an inverted pyramid. This focus on the entailment semiotic-logic seems to have produced a radical change in the way which Peirce conceived the signic relations. This is in accordance with the development Peirce gave to his Theory of Sign in the following years, which will no longer make use of the terms and concepts created before , but actually emphasizes and unfolds the results of his studies in that year.

It was the beginning of his correspondence with Victoria Lady Welby.

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She was a British woman who had been researching about the processes of meaning and interpretation. These letters are a precious source for those interested in following the huge transformations Peirce applied to his theory in the final period of his life. Some scholars even believe that Welby had a decisive influence in this phase. This would explain, at least in part, why Peirce dedicated such an effort to unveil the types of interpretants — sharing with Welby the same field of inquiry. After grounding knowledge on perception and developing a sign taxonomy that seemed acceptable to deal with most logical problems, Peirce moved his attention to the third ramification of semiotic, the Speculative Rhetoric.

His intention was to approach once again the effects produced by the action of the Sign over its interpretant, but now seeing these effects from the results obtained in the former years. In , for example, Peirce came to affirm that the representation had the power of causing real facts EP: , and that the interpretant of the sign did not need to be necessarily a concept, as professed his intellectualist version of his first formulation of Pragmatism. They could be feeling and physical effects, too. Through that, Peirce anticipates the ontological division of interpretants in emotional, energetic and logic that he would make explicit in , taking his Theory of Signs to a new level of complexity.

This is due to, in part, the fact that it represents a revolution in the way Peirce understood his theory, probably motivated once again by his concern to link semiotic with Pragmatism as well as with his metaphysical cosmology. While he smoothed over the matters in order to adjust one discipline to another, Peirce would make constant alterations in the sign classification, most of them tentatively. The pages of his logical notebooks written in this period are full of sketches of classifications, introductions of new terms, a profusion of triadic divisions and many geometric drawings, mainly triangles, used heuristically to explore and make evident the relations among the elements of the classes of the Signs.

Many of these drawings are contradictory and although most of them are dated, Peirce did not authorize us to simply consider the posterior versions as improvements from the previous ones. Whenever Peirce came to an impasse in the research, he would frequently return to the old classifications, sometimes created many years ago, dismissing as incorrect the recent attempts. In , Peirce demonstrated to have adopted a realistic notion of Thirdness, that he interpreted as a kind of conditional future, a would be that could not be reduced to any series of instances.

Consequently, he then explicitly corrected his opinion about the hardness of the object being a matter of subjective opinion and declared that it depended on Pragmatism to insist about the reality of general potentialities in nature Short, , p. The acceptance of the reality of the laws of nature, considered then as habits analogous to the beliefs of the mind, stimulated Peirce to approximate semiotic a bit more which had already been extended to comprise symptoms and physical signals to this ever more realistic Pragmatism.

After all, the pragmatic kernell was precisely the notion of the habit of conduct. Habit became a keyword linking semiotic and Pragmatism. In a series of articles written for the philosophical magazine The Monist during that period, Peirce made the first attempts to extract from semiotic a definite proof of Pragmatism or, more appropriately, Pragmaticism, as he started to call his philosophy in an attempt to dissociate it from the version popularized by James and his disciples.

Note, however, that he still considers the summum bonum of Pragmaticism as being a concept, i. In the course of these researches, Peirce discovered that his logic, seen already as identical to semiotic, could be expressed through a visual syntax based on graphics — named Existential Graphs by Peirce — capable of performing the manipulation of the logical signs in a much better and more concise way. Although Peirce presented two quite developed versions of this graphical system, he would not complete them the way he had wished, probably barred by difficulties to represent the idea of continuum.

However, his research about the Existential Graphs triggered a new branch of logic that has been producing promising results in the more recent years. As Peirce himself points in a letter to Lady Welby, between and he worked intensively over his classification of signs. This new round of inquiries convinced him that a complete classification of all possible signs would demand at least 10 trichotomies that, if freely combined, could result in an astonishing figure of 59, Classes of Signs CP 1.

Nevertheless, Peirce explains, if we impose some logical mathematical limitations, the total number of classes would be restricted to only Peirce also affirms that he had found the need to distinguish between two semiotic objects the immediate, present inside the Sign, and the dynamic, which always remains out of the sign and three types of interpretants that he names as intentional, effective and communicational — but which later would be called immediate, dynamic and final. Thomas Short states — and we agree — that the introduction of these three interpretants does not substitute the trichotomization made in , when he divided the interpretant in emotional, energetic or logic.

The trichotomy immediate, dynamic and logical pertains to the sign considered as a system of relations in evolution or, in other words, as a Class of Sign. The division in emotional, energetic and logic expresses the ontological status that each one of the interpretants immediate, dynamic or logical can 46assume. When the sign is analyzed in its elements and relations, the first division occupies a horizontal axis; the second, a vertical axis. The result of the combination of both of them is that the process of interpretation always occurs in three types of interpretants chosen among nine possibilities.

Nevertheless, he does not see Rhetoric as identical to Methodeutic — the science that studies the methods to be applied in the scientific inquiry. He now sees Methodeutic as Rhetoric in the narrow sense Bergman, , pp. Deducing the implications of increasingly panpsychist cosmology, Peirce concludes that the process of interpretation does not happen only in human minds. On the contrary, it is the existence of interpretation of signs in the world that explains the emergency of human intelligence.

As we have already seen, the universe is a quasi-mind perfused with signs. Reals are signs. Now Peirce considers the co-mind as a necessary pre-supposed so that the sign can transfer the shape of the object to the interpretant in the communication process Houser, , p. Note that the co-mind is neither the fusion of two human minds that communicate, nor just the fusion of minds of a finite community of people, such as a group or society dividing beliefs and common purposes, as preached by his former versions of Pragmatism.

The co-mind is, generically, the fusion of Object, Interpretant and Sign O-I- S at the very moment of communication, when information is transmitted from the Object to Interpretant having the sign as a medium. If we parallel this process with communication, the object assumes the position of an emitter utterer and the interpretant, a receptor 47 interpreter. The sign is the medium and, finally, the message is the Form or Idea information transmitted by the sign.

With the introduction of the concept of co-mind, Peirce was very close to a complete fusion between his Theory of Sign and Pragmatism. The last step would be the elimination of the intellectualist anchor he had placed over his philosophy when he affirmed that the final interpretant of a concept could only be another concept, i. This barrier is finally overcome in , when Peirce develops the concept of ultimate logic interpretant. In order to avoid the infinite progression, Peirce gave to the ultimate logic interpretant the status of a habit or, when the occasion made it necessary, the effect of a change of habit produced by any intelligent mind — not necessarily human.

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In , while Peirce drafted A System of Logic, considered as Semiotic, he affirmed that the ultimate interpretant was not the way a finite group of minds effectively act under the influence of a concept, but as any mind, in the general sense of the word, would act under its effect. This is an important modulation because it harmonizes the general term of logic and semiotic with his idea of Thirdness present in nature, as he had announced in The conditional future, the habit that does not exhausts itself by any number of occurrences, or better saying, the very change of habit towards the full reasonability is now considered as the ultimate purpose of his Pragmatism.

The scholars disagree about the exact place of the ultimate interpretant in the semiotical classification. Savan apud Santaella, , pp believes that it is the highest degree of Thirdness applied to the Dynamic Interpretant because it is the Dynamic Interpretant the one that refers to the effects produced in the mind of the interpreter and capable of generating deliberate conduct, including a change of habit.

The other two interpretants, Immediate and Final, are not that crucial for the pragmatic method. In our opinion, though, it is up to semiotic, as the General Theory of the Signs, to consider the ultimate instance in the Immediate and Final interpretants as well. When the ultimal instance occurs in the Immediate Interpretant, we have a habitualized interpretability; when 48it occurs in the ambit of the Final Interpretant, we have the very sign assuming a habitual purpose, i. If on the one hand semiotic and Pragmatism now appear hand in hand by the concept of habit, on the other hand this union obliged Peirce to review the strength of the pragmatic maxim because the habit is not sustained by logical considerations only, but it demands ethical and aestheticals ones too.

No wonder thus, that Peirce started to place ethics and aesthetics as normative sciences responsible, together with logic, for controlling the human conduct. The Pragmatism or Pragmaticism , set mainly over the deductive logic, becomes limited — not to say diminished — in this new configuration. In fact, in October , a few months before his death and while writing his last article, Peirce shows uncertainty about the validity of the Pragmatism, for his method of clearing up ideas might have been too clung to the analytical deduction while despised the creative power of abduction, or uberty EP2, p.

If Pragmatism is kept restricted to intellectual minds, semiotic does not suffer from this limitation and spreads out through all possible fields of phenomena. When searching in his Theory of Sign for a definite proof of his Pragmaticism, Peirce ended up taking semiotic to the maximum degree of the transdisciplinarity. Semiotic is so general that might even be able to compete with mathematic as the science of the first universal principles. If the universe is made of signs, and semiosis is another name for communication, as Peirce seems to sustain in the final phase of his intellectual life, then a unified theory of reality seen as a process of development of information, if we should be able to conceive it someday, it will necessarily involve semiotic.

See in Liszka , pp. The first and most evident one is the clear affinity linking perception and semiosis. In fact, both processes are based on logical inferences and can have the same elements analyzed, as immediate object, dynamic object, immediate interpretant and abduction. This proximity feeds the hope that a better comprehension of the perceptive process may illuminate some of the obscure points about semiosis. Eco , p. Eco reminds us that Husserl had already discussed this point.