Экспансия — III (Russian Edition)
Stierlitz continues to be a popular character in modern Russia. Despite the fact that references and Stierlitz jokes still penetrate contemporary speech, Seventeen Moments of Spring is very popular mainly because it is quite patriotic. It is repeated annually on Russian television, usually around Victory Day. When his portrayer Vyacheslav Tikhonov died in December , the Foreign Intelligence Service —one of the successor organisations of the former Soviet KGB —sent its condolences to his family.
If anyone missed the connection between Putin, who served in Germany, and von Stierlitz, articles in the press reminded them of the resemblance and helped create the association. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Pop culture Russia! Media and power in post-Soviet Russia.
Zubov claims, alone among Russian historians, that the Great Terror was focused primarily on the various groups of believers in the Soviet Union. In the chapter on the years leading up to the Second World War, Zubov buys into the view, commonly held in Eastern Europe, that Stalin sought to provoke a war between Germany and Great Britain.
But Zubov makes the mistake of citing in support of his thesis a speech supposedly given by Stalin to the Politburo on August 19, No such session was held that day, and the archival document cited is, in fact, a speech in French! To be sure, the author refers significantly enough to the Russian translation of the text published by historian Tatiana Bushueva in the literature magazine Novyi mir in , without devoting a single word to the provenance of the document.
The source-critical review that Sergei Sluch presented in the early s establishes beyond a doubt that the document was drafted by French journalists or intelligence agents purely for propaganda purposes in the autumn of Zubov believes that reason becomes superfluous when it comes to the behavior of the Soviet Union in an international context. As a result of this attitude, Istoriia Rossii XX veka provides no assessments of the realpolitik or even geopolitical factors that the Kremlin may have considered at one time or another.
The extent of repression in the sovietized territories is emphasized, as is the fact that several Western powers never recognized the Soviet annexations. According to Zubov some , inhabitants of the former Baltic states were victims of repression by the NKVD or secret police, by means of elimination of the political elite and mass deportations of whole families to distant settlements in Siberia II, p.
Zubov also attempts to distinguish Russia from the regime that was established. Because he considers the post regime to be illegitimate, having established an oppressive state over the Russian people, it could not have fought for the Fatherland in the true sense. To date it has not been possible to substantiate this hypothesis, which Rezun under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov has asserted since , with archival documents.
Even on logistical grounds, that is, troop transport capacity by rail, it was clear to the Soviet General Staff that, in , the Red Army could not undertake any major operations for anticipatory or pre-emptive purposes. On the other hand, many hundreds of thousands of men were mobilized during the spring and early summer of , all in hopes of being able to stave off the impending attack from Nazi Germany for a few more years.
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As is known, Stalin ultimately reasoned that Germany would not repeat previous historical mistakes and start a two-front war, against Great Britain in the west and Russia in the east. The fact that, in a series of strategic operations Stalingrad and Kursk in , Belorussia in , the Red Army marshals, generals and colonels outshone the most prominent field commanders in the Wehrmacht should be made clear in any synthesis, and here Zubov could have made significantly better use of the research done by Western and Russian military historians in recent years. Zubov presents the period after in a more conventional manner, and his account can be read as a standardized depiction of the Cold War era.
Both international conflicts and internal Soviet complications, particularly the dissident movement, are described in vibrant and dynamic fashion. On the other hand, a reader will look in vain for connections to the debates that have raged between Russian and Western historians, particularly intense since glasnost in the s and following the opening of the Russian archives in the s.
Lennart Samuelson. Andrey Zubov has sent a comment to the editors. Here you can read it in Russian. A translation in English will follow. Lenin paid to secret visits to Berlin in June and July of , and reached an agreement with highly placed military officials to undermine Russian home front during the coming war.
Basingstoke: MacMillan, Anyone who is trying to stay even somewhat abreast of public life in Russia today is well aware of the arguments around national history which have grown particularly vehement in the last two years. Such arguments have gone far beyond purely scientific studies and have become highly politicized, as graphically shown by the establishment of an ad hoc committee under the President of the Russian Federation for the purpose of fighting against historical falsifications.
Similar arguments are also underway in the other communities emerging from the ruins of the Soviet Union, and even more broadly, within the whole former communist bloc. The reason for the arguments is more than clear. Every nation is proud of some of its sons and daughters and erects monuments to them in city squares, names streets and ships after them, and teaches children to take after their glorious predecessors.
They are a disgrace to the nation. In the late s, Russia and its adjoining countries, which had lived through decades of totalitarian dictatorship, took a sharp turn towards democracy, civil and political freedoms, and openness in culture, the economy, and public life. People in these countries were not of one mind about this transition.
Those who still prefer the old communist wine also want to live in a system of the old ideas and stereotypes underpinning communist life. Those who condemn the past also reject the past communist ideology, and consider it a fiction. But a theory is proven by how it is practised. To understand whether the communist ideology is false or true, one needs to thoroughly review its practical implementation, that is, to move from philosophical reasoning to historical evaluation.
The reason the controversy about history is so heated in post-communist societies is that it is an argument about truth and falsehood, right and wrong, honour and dishonesty. It involves an endless number of people, living and dead, including those who collaborated in one way or another with the communist regime, and those who resisted it to the extent they were able. What were people to do: collaborate or resist? That is the main point of the ongoing public discussion that may heal or kill our souls, and in which a historian has an important, if not leading, role.
This is neither good nor bad; it is simply a fact. But having entered, for the time being, the arena of politics, history is by no means freed from obligations to conduct research in ways that ensure accuracy, honesty, impartiality, and scientific objectivity. Without these, history would make no sense.
However, impartiality does not mean indifference. In the domain of the humanities, the scholar must not treat the object of his or her research in a heartless way. A true historian must combine sober detachment with love—something that is always difficult to achieve. In the introduction to the work, we stated honestly that the object of our love is humanity, who has the highest value and serves as the true measure of any historical event. We also stated that the truth of historical fact is absolutely indispensable.
Historical truth and human destiny: this is the rationale for our book. Our book was published in July , and a few months later—the weighty tomes totalling pages took time to read—commentaries started to come in, some with fulsome praise, others critical.
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We were prepared for such a diversity of opinion, because our book is a fact of public life, and there is currently a profound split in society regarding both the past and the future. However, there was one thing that we accepted with equal gratitude both from critics and fans, and that was suggestions concerning factual mistakes, inaccuracies, and misprints.
We immediately started preparing a new revised and updated edition, which we hope will come off the press as early as However, when my colleagues and I read through Dr. Distinguished for his scrupulous accuracy and attention to detail, Dr. Samuelson this time made a number of mistakes in the description of the structure itself of the work under review, mistakes which, it would seem to us, should have been impossible to make.
Part 3 of the book contains not one, but two chapters, and, correspondingly, not 35 but 55 subchapters. If Dr. Samuelson had looked through the aforesaid chapter, he could not have failed to notice that all of the military operations he mentioned have special sections devoted to each, describing in close detail the importance of these great battles against the general background of the war in all of its theatres, from the Pacific, to Africa, and the Atlantic.
The reviewer expressed his surprise that in our book we ignore the history of ordinariness, descriptions of the everyday life of ordinary people. This criticism is more than strange, as we deliberately set out to focus more closely on the history of the ordinary than is normally the case with such generalizing treatments of history. Section 5. There are also special sections in the book devoted to the life of Soviet Buddhists and Muslim groups. How could Dr. Samuelson not have noticed this?
One gets the distinct impression that he was in a hurry and did not familiarize himself very thoroughly with the structure of the book he was reviewing.
This impression becomes even stronger when he moves from the structural analysis to the characterization of the team of authors. Our book was written by more than 40 authors, with their names and academic degrees listed in a long compendium opening Volume 1 of the work. However, Dr. He should have known that Yuri Pivovarov, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is not only a leading specialist in Russian history and public attitudes but also the Chairman of the Expert Board of the Higher State Academic Awards Commission,  responsible for granting the title of Doctor of History.
Samuelson may not be aware, but Professor Nikita Struve of Paris is an excellent specialist on Russian emigration; Vladislav Zubok is a professor at Temple University, Philadelphia, whose books on the history of the Cold War have been republished in many languages and reviewed extensively; Sergei Firsov is a professor at St. Petersburg University, who published several monographs on the history of the Russian Church during the pre-Revolutionary period, and has just published a two-volume scholarly work on the life of Emperor Nikolas II; Alexandr Pantsov is a professor of Russian History at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio, who specializes in the same period as the reviewer himself, with a slightly different focus, the Komintern and Soviet-Chinese relations.
No doubt, Samuelson is aware of the name of the British scholar Count Nikolai Tolstoy-Miloslavsky and his book The Yalta Victims, and he most certainly knows the names of researchers at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, such as the Deputy Director Research Vladimir Lavrov; Academic Secretary and Doctor of History, Vladimir Shestakov; and, possibly, also the two young and gifted historians, the Lobanov husband and wife, who defended their Candidate theses under the direction of V. It is hard to imagine that Samuelson is completely unaware of the world-renowned Russianist, professor at the University of Venice Vittorio Strada.
Many more examples could be cited. Having used such unfair and offensive language with respect to the above-named individuals and other authors of A History of 20th Century Russia, Dr. Samuelson made an obviously false statement and grossly violated the rules of ethical conduct. Moreover, in his review Dr. Is it not shameful that a comparatively young Russianist should accuse such a body of his colleagues of lacking the skills taught at the history department of any university?
As far as I am personally concerned, Dr. Untrue again. With certain reservations, the history of religious ideas could be termed the history of religions, but on no account could it be called religious history. Incidentally, it is clear that when Alexandr Solzhenitsyn contacted me in , suggesting that I write a textbook on Russian history, it was not because I teach the History of Religious Ideas. Samuelson might have wondered what other research in Russian studies the editor-in-chief of the book under review had published. Had he checked, he would have found scores of titles published in many languages.
But Dr. Samuelson was either lazy or decided that it would serve him best to present A. But, instead of limiting himself to such a statement, Dr. Samuelson, Professor Pipes read both volumes thoroughly before making any public comments about our book. He sent me numerous remarks; tips about inaccuracies, including the most minute, essential suggestions; and points—all of them accepted with gratitude—and ended up writing a brilliant psychological profile of Vladimir Lenin in his biography for the new edition of our book, thus actually moving from reviewer to co-author.
Samuelson forgot to indicate that the said Vice-Rector is Alexei Podberyozkin, who was a member of the Russian Communist Party faction at the State Duma — , and who, on behalf of the left radical Patriotic Front competed with Vladimir Putin for the presidency in receiving 0. His co-author in preparing a comment on our book is Alexandr Sergeev, who for a few days was Minister of the Press with the Yanayev government, during the abortive attempt to overthrow Gorbachev in August It is obvious why such people would hold a negative view of our History.
What is not clear, however, is why Dr. Samuelson chose not to include such important details, nor to include the fact that Mr. All of the above points make it possible to consider Dr. But what is the gist of the bias, and what is the tendency? To understand this, certain specific remarks by Dr. Samuelson should be analysed. They are not many in number. Samuelson] at one and the same time praises and then denigrates sections [of the book] which are beyond his professional competence.
Samuelson completely excluded many sections and chapters from his analysis. This applies to the whole pre-Revolutionary portion of the book except V. Neither does he say a word about the chapters devoted to Perestroika, or to the modern history of Russia. Samuelson focuses on the subjects that he knows well, such as the Revolution, Bolshevik repressions, famine, dekulakization, and the struggle for power among the members of the Bolshevik establishment in the s. Comments by a professional are welcome. By now, thanks to such comments, we have corrected many inaccuracies and errors in the book.
It proved impossible to add or correct anything in the book based on the results of his review, for Dr. It should be noted that this is a term very seldom used by scholars of history, and Dr. For some reason, this respectable Western European historian is fond of using wordings typical of his Russian colleagues. Could it be because he is linked to them in many research and publishing projects?
Russian nationalism as a geopolitical phenomenon
The question is whether Andrei Zubov and his coauthors can explain why, in , it was Russia in particular that became the first country in which the originally 19 th century socialist ideas were tested? If he had read the book more closely, he would have seen that on numerous occasions, and for very different reasons—from economic to religiously confessional—we explain how one or another phenomenon of Russian life paved the way towards revolution. Both the Kaiser and Lenin were latecomers on the scene and were far from being the main begetters of our national tragedy.
With complete disregard for the circumstances, they made use—Lenin ingeniously—of what had already developed long before their time. How could Samuelson have failed to notice all that while reading the book?
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All the facts that we cited have precise references. Therefore, if they are doubted at all, it should be for good reason. But our arguments should not be distorted in a review for the sake of a witty remark. Spiridonovich reports that in June and July Lenin went to Berlin twice to elaborate a plan of subversive activities in the Russian army rear in cooperation with the German intelligence service. He was promised 70 million Deutschmarks for the job. The German Foreign Ministry had a program of activities written by Lenin that he proposed to implement after seizing power in Russia.
Second, General Spiridonovich writes that Berlin promised Lenin 70 million marks an enormous sum of money! Third—and this is crucial—we do not conclude that the Revolution was controlled by the Kaiser. There were a thousand reasons for the Revolution, so we discuss the key ones. It is not we who simplify the reconstruction, it is the reviewer who simplifies it, all the while ascribing his own simplifications and distortions to the book.
Such an approach could hardly be called fair criticism. The position of contemporary Russian imitators of Bolshevism is clear, but what is unclear is why the Swedish historian should adhere to it. By now, there is plenty of evidence confirming the instigated nature of the uprising on the part of what were actually Kronstadt seamen, and not workers. In general, when reading the review, one has the persistent impression that there is a strange attempt to justify Lenin and his methods of seizing and holding on to power.
His choice of terminology is characteristic. Samuelson claims that we disregarded the latest studies containing calculations of the number of victims of the terror employed by the Bolsheviks against those who fought against their power the resisters ; that is, the reviewer considers the Red Terror of — as a form of struggle against the active enemies of the regime. Again, this is what was written in Soviet textbooks, but now everyone knows that those were false statements.
In villages, hard-working and well-off farmers were very often taken hostage and they perished. The Red Terror was a nightmare for Russian society at that time and we can feel its consequences in the present. The great sociologist Pitirim Sorokin—who miraculously escaped being shot—wrote later:. If the general death rate in Petrograd and Moscow tripled as compared with normal times, then for scholars it multiplied by five or six. Is any irony relevant here? As for the statistics, they cannot be complete as we stress in the book, but they testify to the horrific scope of the crimes committed by Lenin and his Bolsheviks against humanity.
However, in our case the historical demographic calculations were made by a highly qualified professional, so if they are to be challenged, it should only be on the basis of points of fact. We cited the testimony of The Scotsman daily only because it shows that European society was aware of the real scope of the Bolshevik terror as early as the beginning of the s. In all probability, Dr. Unlike the respected reviewer, I believe that in the 20th century socialist ideas were tested by labour sympathizers in the United Kingdom, by Franklin Roosevelt in the USA, and by social democrats in Sweden and Denmark.
Socialism is a teaching whose objective is the good of the community. He does not believe that the famines of — and — were instigated by the Bolshevik powers, as stated in our book based on extensive proof. On the contrary, referring to the Holodomor [Hunger Plague] of —, Dr. Incidentally, the title of Section 2. Hence, endless arguments, studies of the drought level during those years, and the obliviousness to the simple facts that, by a decision of the Politbureau, all of the grain was confiscated from the peasants to be sold abroad, while millions of people were dying of hunger and degenerating to the level of cannibalism.
In this area, too, our book aims to dethrone a Bolshevik myth, rather than calling into question scientific facts, however clearly those facts still need to be refined, and whose details can still be argued. But why, instead of discussing facts, Dr. Samuelson once again advocates the old Bolshevik myth that the Soviet authorities took care of the hungry peasants, is not clear. We also fail to understand Dr. Meanwhile, this section discusses one of the most frightening manifestations of totalitarian communism: its attitude towards children.
The street urchin problem was created by the Bolshevik policy of Red Terror and organized famine. The reviewer is absolutely wrong when he alleges that World War I was one of its causes. The death of many young men in the war did not result in the problem of homeless children, for the simple reason that the bereaved children still had their mothers and grandparents, and the village community and systems of social charity remained intact.
It was only the slaughter and death of all the adults in many families during the Red Terror of — and during the Holodomor of ——with their ensuing epidemics—that resulted in millions of children being bereft of any adult relatives at all. Incidentally, it is an indirect proof of the scope of Bolshevik misdeeds. The tragedy was repeated during the Holodomor of — It was not rapid industrialization and collectivization but the ghastly social policy of the Bolsheviks that caused a new surge of homeless children in the mids.
As a matter of fact, rapid industrialization in the United States, or pre-Revolutionary Russia, was not accompanied by similar phenomena on a comparable scale. By the time of the New Economic Policy the problem of homeless children was really resolved through the humanistic methods and the activities of such devoted educators as Anton Makarenko.
But ten years later, everything was different; this is the period discussed in Section 3. The dreadful law giving full legal responsibility to year-old children, including making them liable to the death penalty, is an explicit and irrefutable proof thereof. The witnesses who escaped to the West left horrifying descriptions of the conditions prevailing in children's penal colonies. It is pointless for Samuelson to be so sceptical of the memoirs of Walter Krivitsky. Some of the horrific details provided by Krivitsky were confirmed by other independent sources e.
When Dr. It goes without saying that a considerable number of homeless children did grow up to become functioning adults. The book never states that all homeless children became victims of the repression. But it is quite another matter to consider what they were taught in Soviet orphanages, and what kind of life was offered to them. This legend is a lie. Bolshevism was no less cruel towards children than it was towards adults. It kept generating and then eliminating the problem of homeless children and forever crippled their souls in orphanages and residential colonies with their compulsory atheism and training in class hatred.
So if we are to apply Dr. Why should an Associate Professor from the Stockholm Higher School of Economics repeat the arguments of Russian communist historians whose purpose, far from condemning Bolshevism for its crimes against underage children, has been to conceal objectionable facts from the community? But, possibly, the climax of the trend that Dr. Samuelson is loyal to throughout the review is his justification of the actions of Stalin and Molotov in international politics in — The article briefly describes the five periods of Ancient Russia development related to the activities of five generations of rulers: , , , , The article concludes that the notions of Ortega y Gasset on the decisive role of the generations dynamics in the societal development serve as an adequate reflection of political genesis.
There were no key words in the original publication.
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The article validates the statement by J. The article reviews the two generation replacement scenarios: the one with inheriting the authority and the one with elections of the person out of the prevailing population members. If the authority is inherited, the average age of new rulers is approx. In case of the electoral system, the average age of new rulers is to amount to NOTE The average age of coming to power depends on the period, for which the Head of State is elected. This effect was ignored in the article.
Powers were inherited in Russia from the 10th century to After , the election of the leaders began; the age of coming to power in averaged at 54 46 in and 62 in , and 52 in Therefore, there is a drastic divergence between actual data and theoretical expectations: 33 instead of 45 in and 46 and 62 instead of A good correlation is observed after only. President and V. Thus, there was just a minor divergence between actual data and theoretical expectations in the U.
It is curious to compare the U. The article makes a conclusion that the pattern proposed by Ortega y Gasset is surprisingly stable and that the actual potential of the pattern has not yet been revealed. An individual is able to adequately perceive the behavior of a relatively small group of persons in the real time mode.
If, in any community, the entire variety of human behavior is squeezed into a set from CDC of functional roles, such community can be controlled by one person in the real time mode. The key problem with such type of government is that a set of CDC of functional roles is by hundreds and thousands of times smaller than the real set of functional roles, which takes shape spontaneously in the multi-million community.
So it is by violence only that the functional variety of the community may be squeezed into CDC set, by tensing the strength of the punitive authorities of the State. Substitution of the CDC set for another one needs a large-scale violence, too. OSW Commentary no , Much seems to indicate that the Ulyukaev case is an element of the rivalry of opposing groups of interest inside the Russian ruling elite. However, the developments seen over the past year show that Igor Sechin remains the key player in the Russian energy sector. The conflict between interest groups is an integral element of the Russian political system, and allows the Russian president to play the role of arbiter in the government elite.
The rules of operation of this system are unlikely to change significantly in the coming years. Russian or Eurasian civilization is Russian or Eurasian civilization is the youngest of the five ones. From the first centuries of its existence, Eurasian society adopted the cultural forms of neighbors. The average duration of ruling generations is 32 years Starting to borrow innovations from Western Europe in 15thth centuries, the Eurasian regime had the opportunity to deploy a powerful territorial expansion in Asia and partly in Europe.
In the early 20th century, the Eurasian regime dominated on the vast area from Finland, Poland and the Danube mouth to Persia, Manchuria and Kamchatka. Territorial expansion may not be infinite. From the second half of the 18th century the Eurasian power regime was destined to move from the extensive growth due to territorial expansion to the intensive growth within permanent borders.
The Russian Empire could not solve this problem and collapsed in The Soviet Union was unable to solve this problem and collapsed in The Russian Federation faces the same problem. ANNEX to the article includes tables and charts illustrating the patterns of rhythm of generations of three civilizations: Russia , China , and India The summary and keywords were missing in the original publication. The author underlines the rapid growth of interest of the Russian society towards the questions of foreign policy, as well as noticeable empowerment of public opinion regarding the formulation and adoption of decisions in the area of foreign policy.
Keywords: international relations, state, foreign policy, State Duma, State Council, Russia, parliamentarism, foreign policy decisions, foreign policy mechanism, public opinion. Capitalists of All Russia, Unite! Business Mobilization Under Debilitated Dirigisme. Political mobilization of business forces in the post-communist world has crucial implications for economic development and civil society.