Social Exclusion in European Cities: Processes, Experiences and Responses (Regions and Cities)
Project results The project is confined to FBOs that are active in combating social exclusion within participating countries and does not include FBOs that primarily operate in the international arena or that are involved in other areas such as school board associations. The basic assumption of the study is that the role of FBOs is increasing because they are filling the gap that was left after the supposed withdrawal of the welfare state, particularly in social welfare and social protection.
Welfare states were built on the hypothesis of almost full-employment, which means that a large and lasting number of unemployed people result in overburdening the financial means of the system, leading to 'fiscal crisis of the welfare state'. Welfare states are challenged by offspring of former 'guest workers'. This generation is part of the working population less. As a result, the gap widened between supply of and demand for welfare provisions. This offered an opportunity for FBOs. Changes in ideological context brought a shift to more individual explanations for social problems.
We witnessed the increasing importance of values as an inspiration for secular society, a trend toward de-secularisation or post-secularism. This development could explain the increasing importance in welfare supply by FBOs. A growing number of individuals seem willing to volunteer.
Volunteering in a FBO does not necessarily imply membership in any church or adherence to a religion. The urban dimension of poverty and other forms of social exclusion has remained as important as ever before and is the focus of FACIT. Both income inequality and relative poverty have risen over the last two decades. The rise has been significant and widespread, affecting more than three-quarters of OECD countries. The income gap between the richest and the poorest has grown. On the whole, the poor population grew by 1.
However, these trends have not been universal. Welfare state regimes 'Welfare society' refers to the non-state dimension of a regime, which is about the role that NGOs play in the provision of welfare. Analysis of welfare provisions should take into account welfare state and welfare society dimension and of the relation between both. In some countries, this welfare society is well developed, in other countries it is rather complementary because the social democratic character of the state remains strongly articulated. The specificity of welfare arrangements has not prevented the construction of a typology of welfare regimes.
Three welfare regimes can be identified: the Nordic social-democratic regime, the continental conservative regime, and the liberal regime. This typology was completed with two 'residual' regimes: the 'Mediterranean' regime and that of the former Eastern Bloc countries. In both cases social insurance covering is weak and families and charity are expected to provide social care.
Countries that do not fit into any regime are described as 'hybrid'. The Nordic social-democratic welfare regime is largely universalistic; its goal is to realise a high level of social protection for everybody, while reducing income differences. Entitlement to social benefits is not related to a person's occupational class; everyone participates in the same scheme.
Access conditions are based on citizenship rights and not on former employment history. Employment plays a crucial role in this regime and people are motivated to find work; active labour market policies and training programmes are widely available. Retirement age is high and women are actively supported to enter the labour market.
If a minimum wage is present and the amount is low, which opens the labour market to low-production employment. Typical for the continental regime is the close relation between previous occupation and entitlement to social benefits: access and level are based on a history of paid contributions. Rights and entitlements often differ between occupational groups and welfare states sustain existing income differentials. Continental countries emphasise the protection of families with children. Labour participation of women generally is low, because this regime is often fosters the traditional family structure.
Retirement age is low, thus participation rates of the elderly are also low. Incentives for disabled people to work are low since eligibility for disability benefit is determined mainly by employment history. Amounts of social assistance are relatively low. The liberal welfare regime provides low means-tested benefits for a restricted number of beneficiaries.
Strict access conditions are applied. The rest of the population is stimulated to purchase private social insurance plans. This results in a form of 'dual society', opposing a group of low-income state dependents to a group of people able to afford insurance plans. Because people are encouraged to participate in the labour force, the minimum wage is low and the pension age is high. The low levels of benefits and the strict access conditions encourage women to enter the labour market.
Social Exclusion in European Cities by Ali Madanipour
In Sweden, social democracy and the welfare state 'grew up together', hence why Sweden is commonly regarded as 'the' model of the Nordic Social Democratic welfare state. The state has extensive public responsibilities for social care, poverty reduction and preventive social work. Voluntary initiatives were primary actors in the delivery of welfare services. Today, the Swedish welfare state is highly institutionalised and is characterised by universalism. The Swedish welfare state caters for a large part of the population and is not primarily concerned with the needs of the poor.
Although Germany is the prototype the welfare state, all German governments regarded the Scandinavian welfare state model as their ideal. German reality has included many neo-liberal elements. Markets were increasingly liberalised and welfare state services reduced, which led to a retrenchment of the welfare state. The characterisation of Belgium as a continental-corporatist country rests mainly on its continued protection of employed people. The direct link between occupation and entitlement to benefits is strongly embedded society.
Only people with an employment history are well protected by the social security system. Unemployment benefits are fairly high and unrestricted in time. A guaranteed minimum income is part of the basic social protection scheme. The United Kingdom UK represents a liberal welfare state, embodying a truncated universalism of limited benefits and low taxes resting on the longstanding demarcation of the deserving and undeserving. Many statist elements remain in welfare provision, albeit subject to means-testing and growing residualisation of the most vulnerable.
The UK has followed a complex, even contradictory path of state centralised mixed economy of welfare, whilst maintaining some degree of universal provision through institutions such as the national health service and national pension insurance. The UK welfare regime has undergone considerable changes. At present, primary responsibility for welfare provision is shared between citizens. There is a safety net of flat-rate entitlements and means-tested benefits for eligible socially excluded groups and a range of quasi-markets consisting of public funding for both non-profit voluntary organisations and for-profit private organisations that become enrolled into the welfare administration.
Market-based logics of individual choice, economic efficiency and competitiveness inspire the design, delivery and evaluation of social welfare programmes. Countries like Spain are defined as a highly fragmented 'corporatist' models with a hyper protected and an under protected section of the workforce. The latter refers to the unemployed with little income support and temporary contracts or informal economy.
In certain respects, it is an amalgamation of the strict conservative model. The state traditionally played a weak role in terms of social expenditure; the family always acted as safety net. Having contacts is crucial in some areas and sectors to obtain a good job. Institutionally, there is a consolidation of a quasi-federal system in which regions assume most social policy responsibilities, which often results in each region having its own strategy.
The increasing impact of the market approach led to reforms in terms of labour segmentation and the development of a low added value sector in detriment of industry. Important socio-demographic changes have taken place: a steep increase of the population and an increased share of migrants. The Dutch welfare state shows hybrid characteristics. A typical example is the pension system. Other benefits are either in line with the continental or Nordic regime. Unemployment benefits are reasonably high and in line with the continental regime.
In line with the Nordic countries, social assistance rates are fairly high as well. No distinction is made between occupational and non-occupational disability and as a consequence, non-occupational disability benefits are comparatively high. The recent de-centralisation of social policy and growing obligations in an otherwise generous welfare system are complementing recent rightwards shifts.
At first sight, its recent development brings Turkey closer to the liberal regime, although strong remains of a pre-industrial system of protection are present. Liberalisation and the establishment of a market-oriented system in most social and labour market sectors led to the decline of public welfare. For the liberal-conservative governments the way to social security was family and community and therefore they have given precedence to the family over the individual. The aim of liberal-conservative governments was to reduce state expenditures in the fields of education, health and social services, without paying much attention to the quality of public services.
Education, social security and health expenditures occupy a small share in the national income when compared to developed countries. The state encouraged house ownership but followed a populist and laissez faire policy in the issue of squatter settlements. In , a new social aid system was adopted. Another division can be made according to religions. Countries should be differentiated first by a Catholic-Protestant divide, and Protestant countries into Lutheran and reformist.
This results in three subtypes: Catholic countries, Lutheran countries and non-Lutheran or reformist countries.
ISBN 13: 9781853026096
According to his model, FBOs are less frequent in Lutheran countries, while in reformist ones they are more widespread. In some countries, FBOs are more effective while they are secondary in countries with a strong centralist tradition. In these countries, FBOs are subsystems of the traditional welfare model.
The position and role of religion Three historical structures have characterised governmental arrangements with religion: the national church, separation and the concordat. The national church model is directed to create vast religious structures, while 'separatist' states rather strive to laicise. The concordat state occupies a midway position between these types: the focus is on finding or creating authoritative and representative religious bodies with which government can negotiate. The concordat permits the religious collective to take advantage of their collective power to bargain for legal spaces specific to their religious tradition.
It creates serious issues for religious groups that are not hierarchically organised and governed. One common characteristic of Belgium and the Netherlands is that for the period between the end of the s, the political, social and cultural landscape was characterised by its 'pillarisation', which refers to the vertical organisation of society according to dominant 'ideologies'.
Education was the first sector to be pillarised; other sectors of society would follow, gradually strengthening the 'pillarisation' of both societies.
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This was called a 'consociational democracy'; the institutionalisation of religious and ideological diversity in the political system with confessional 'pillars' as strong bulwarks of organisations and subcultures. Increasing prosperity, higher levels of education and social mobility, individualisation, and mass secularisation weakened the collective and organised dimension of all Western European societies. Belgium and the Netherlands were increasingly 'de-pillarised' and 'secularised', and the religious landscape drastically diversified as a result of immigration since the s.
So-called 'guest workers' stayed and brought their families in; their share in the population increased and so did the number of Muslims. Asylum seekers would further increase and diversify the Muslim population. The separation of state and church and the tradition of 'pillarisation' provided these 'new' religious minorities with favourable opportunity structures to establish places of worship, education and mass media.
Second and third-generation Muslim migrants show lower levels of religious participation than their parents. Sweden is a latecomer in terms of a formally secularised society. Religious freedom was legally introduced in , but even today the monarch and the government minister responsible for ecclesiastical affairs are mandatory members of the Church of Sweden. Today, the Church of Sweden has the same status as other faith-communities, which are entitled to certain benefits.
Those registered faith-communities include a vast array of orientations ranging from Christian, Muslim or Jewish to pagan devotees. The Church of England and the state still are closely connected; the constitutional monarch still holds the position of head of the church and senior bishops still are entitled to a seat in the House of Lords. It increasingly uses its position to oppose state practice and the outcomes of state policy.
Christianity remains the predominant religion in this country, but this group includes a wide variety of different denominations. After Christianity, the largest religious group is Muslim. Adherents of Christian religion are spread fairly evenly across the country, but other major faith groups are clearly concentrated in the major urban conurbations.
Religion outside of Christianity forms an important part of the urban landscape in many UK cities. In Germany, a majority of Both Protestants and Catholics have lost adherents. Non-Christian denominations have increased in tenfold over the last 26 years and the share of persons without denomination has more than doubled.
The reduced attendance of religious events is not interpreted by all scholars as secularisation, but as a trend toward individualisation of religion or religiosity. They argued that lower adherence to churches does not imply lower religiosity; instead, individuals take elements from different religions to create a 'patchwork religion', which cannot be identified with a single church. Spain is an exceptional case when it comes to the position of religion in society.
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The legitimacy of the Catholic Church, which before the transition to democracy held the monopoly of education and welfare provision, decreased and consequently suffered important mutations. It no longer defines society's moral standards and values, but has become one actor among others in an explicit social, political and moral debate. A dualism exists within the Catholic Church.
Whereas the hierarchy is rather conservative, other sectors of the church have a more progressive discourse in relation to poverty, exclusion and welfare. The founding of the Turkish Republic was inspired by modern Western rules and values. In the process of nation building, religion was pushed out of public life, and replaced by modern structures and values. The founders of the Turkish Republic preferred to control religious affairs, and they did so through the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Diyanet controls the Mosques and has adopted the Sunni cult of Islam, whereas the unique conditions of the Alevi sect contributed to the emergence of their own religious services and worship centres.
Because they stayed out of the mosque, Alevi institutions gained a comparative freedom. That mosques always have been controlled by the state prevented the emergence of 'church-like' FBOs. Many have reached a tolerable compromise between their faith and their work. This enables them to distance themselves from the worst excesses of their faith, access secular funding, keep a diverse staff team together and support partners in a variety of faith contexts.
Muslim FBOs tend to be clearer about their faith identity. Being younger, more homogenously staffed and less dependent on public funds, Muslim FBOs have been less influenced by the secular environment. Faith identity can have profound organisational implications and can affect how they operate internally.
It can alter how they relate externally and with whom. To a degree they are products of their environments. To survive they must adapt. In some countries, discussion of faith is taboo. Many do not want to emphasise the faith-base of their organisation because they fear that this will be interpreted as 'arrogance'. Others have downplayed the importance of faith in an effort to be more professional.
The constitutional separation between state and religion makes European governments sensitive to FBOs using public funds to propagate one faith over another. While Muslim FBOs appear to have fewer problems explicitly integrating their faith with their work, the mainstream Christian FBOs have found this more challenging. Many FBO recipients of government money feel they have to separate out the spiritual dimension in their mission, which can be a disintegrating process.
Faith can be related more easily with alternative worldviews, facilitating an analysis of difference, which relates to both belief and action. This analysis, when applied to social action on social welfare issues impacts on the assumption that a 'neutral' secular state is the best arbiter of this difference. Some initial perspectives perceived good practice in terms of a professionalised neutrality supported by a basic awareness of possible cultural differences. Such perspectives quickly became challenged when practitioners had to address different potential purposes apparent in everyday situations which presented them with dilemmas.
With conventional training denying or limiting any place for reflexion which incorporated faith as part of the own identity, practitioners were left to draw their own idiosyncratic conclusions. Just structuring in isolated opportunities to consider faith-related issues was considered problematic. Recognising difference and incorporating reflexion on difference within practitioner development is crucial. The ability of practitioners to develop their understanding of the relationship between identity, worldview and practice can help to handle difference within everyday practice.
Deciding on a course of action can then flow out of an integrated worldview with a clearly-considered connection between personal and professional. The formation of a framework which enables them to make connections between these issues which facilitates future reflexion is crucial. Most FBOs do not ask whether they serve a particular religious group.
For few FBOs, conversion is part of their service delivery. The importance of evangelicalism varies from being explicit, implicit to being no goal of FBOs. New evangelical migrant churches on the other hand that have entered the scene recently are open about their mission: they want to help society by providing practical aid and saving souls. Many FBOs hire faith-members or ask from personnel to subscribe to their mission statement, but there are also FBOs that hire people irrespective of faith criteria.
When FBOs are located in areas with high levels of secularisation, they often have to contract other religious or non-religious personnel. Some Christian FBOs try to attract personnel from different faith groups, in order to mirror the religious background of their target groups or to present themselves as post secular pluralist organisations. FBO hiring policies are subject to debates in several countries. While volunteers are often recruited from faith communities, there are examples of FBOs attracting non-religious volunteers as well. These volunteers want to join because of the outspoken identity of projects in terms of solidarity and justice, the target groups they address and the approach to individuals and families in need.
The importance of missions varies from being an explicit, over an implicit to being no goal of FBOs. More recently established evangelical churches are more open and explicit about their mission. There are cross-country differences found within the same or related FBOs. The reasons to do this depend on the specific social and political role of FBOs. The FBOs and NGOs gave the following reasons to cooperate: - the possibility to get to know each other better and to be an 'open door' in church and the mosque; - the opportunity to exchange information on services; - the chance to initiate contacts for the future; - to increase funds; - the possibility to serve people in the right place at the right time; - the ability to stay informed about each other's functioning and the chance to address problems.
There are also reasons not to cooperate with others. There may be lack of time and manpower, competition, different religious backgrounds or differences in visions on combating social exclusion. Irrespective of these barriers, there seems to be a growing interest to get into closer contact. However, public tendering creates competition and conflicts. A great deal of work needs to be done to make better sense of what difference faith makes in the frame of theo-ethical questions of motivation, post-secular ethics of engagement, liminal, transitional and radical spaces of faith-based praxis and wider concerns of what it means to get something done in our post-political times.
Poverty and social exclusion 3. The associations of independent welfare work have their own ideological or religious motives and objectives. There are 'private welfare organisations', providing social services on an entrepreneurial basis. For Britain, the traditional association between faith-groups and social welfare has resulted in a longstanding presence of faith in the provision of services. Several reasons could account for this: the long history of church schools, the seemingly timeless activities of some FBOs or the historic inflection of social politics in religious denominations such as Methodism.
Even during the post-war development of a welfare state, faith motivated involvement in the welfare landscape has been a continuing feature of the UK. When the state took over most of the welfare programmes that FBOs ran, some of them entered into the compact contracts that were offered and they found themselves locked into controlled ways of operating.
Some FBOs preferred to remain independent, thus leading to 'insider' and 'outsider' voluntary agencies. Insider agencies accept government funding, but will have to trade in part of their ethos and their character. Outsider organisations are more likely to work on limited budgets and rely on volunteers.
Muslims participate in the delivery of welfare services in the UK, but their engagement tends to be through networks of independent mosques. The shortage of national Muslim welfare organisations can be explained in part by geographical distribution and urban clustering of the Muslim population. The majority of British Muslims exercise their anti-poverty efforts through individual actions. In Spain, Catholic oriented FBOs are hegemonic, but there are different kinds of Catholic FBOs: religious congregations and orders, lay organisations with religious ends, and Catholic social action organisations.
Other FBOs are just starting. Not all have a well-developed and oiled structure of social assistance, partly because they are relatively new, partly because they do not have a tradition of providing services beyond their community. Catholic FBOs are part of a complex institutional setting, which could be called a parallel institutional world.
This world is dominated by a few big organisations, some medium sized initiatives, and by a huge amount of locally based projects. Many smaller organisations just perform their tasks as service providers for local or regional institutions, relying on their own resources. Another dividing line within the Catholic FBOs runs between the more progressive initiatives which are close to the ideological left and which are strongly involved in issues and another set of organisations that are more conservative in values and tradition.
Those are not as strongly committed to social action, but rather focus on prayer and proselytising. Some think that non-profit organisations just seek financing and that public authorities need their voluntary and professional labour force to cover the gaps in the social service network. Others fear that their economic dependency makes NGOs accept public sector targets and strategies and they are reduced to implement social policy. One step furthers goes the claim NGOs are increasingly becoming a legitimising channel of public policies and stabilising the social order in some of the most vulnerable sectors.
Globalisation is one of the main elements that connect dynamics in the European cities: immigration flows, the economic and financial impact of external processes, and changes in local productive logics. In each country, these common trends have produced different effects due to structural and policymaking variables.
The German welfare state provides material security, social and cultural welfare and education. Welfare provision is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. Private responsibility is regarded as more important than state responsibility. The state operates in those fields not covered by the third sector.
In some cities, there is an increased polarisation and a deterioration of the situation in poverty areas. New forms of poverty have developed with new groups demanding for assistance, multi-problem situations and a decrease in social mobility. Despite the strength of the Swedish welfare state and the high living standards of the population, there is poverty and social exclusion among some groups.
This is regarded a local level problem rather than a national one. Poverty is overrepresented in certain city areas and affects residents of foreign origin. There are beneficiaries from social services living on public spaces in central areas or using them extensively. Some urban areas are increasingly experiencing segregation, social exclusion, poverty and violence. There is a polarisation of poverty in Belgium along different lines: regional, urban-rural and within the cities. Several socioeconomic causes explain the concentration of poverty in specific neighbourhoods: industrial decay, neighbourhood stigmatisation, overrepresentation of low-income groups, social expenditure cuts.
Social housing estates concentrate social exclusion in a vicious circle, which welfare and urban policy do not seem to be able to tackle successfully.
The context of poverty in the Netherlands seems to follow similar patterns for the three cities in this project. Even if there has been innovation and transition in the production system or the unemployment rates have been reduced, poverty is still higher in households of foreign origin people that tend to concentrate in specific areas of the city, generally out of the city centre.
There are also vulnerable social groups with specific causes of exclusion living in more central areas. Poverty in Spain has experienced socioeconomic dynamics that have redefined its maps: immigration, population ageing and fast economic growth followed by abyssal economic crises. Poor households concentrate in the city centres and post war peripheries of Madrid and Barcelona. Spanish city neighbourhoods are rather heterogeneous in social and ethnic composition due to the lack of big public housing estates that concentrate and reproduce problems they intend to solve.
Research describes the nature and dimensions of urban poverty in main Turkish cities as a result of poor planning, rural-urban immigration and low quality standards of housing and urban quality of life, among other structural reasons. Despite the importance of neighbourhoods with self-constructed houses without regular building permits, there are neighbourhoods of apartment buildings with high rates of poverty and social exclusion.
Some inner city neighbourhoods share these conditions and the presence of highly stigmatised and marginalised groups. Urban social and demographic change have worsened the conditions of lower income residents due to the crisis of social and family institutions. The UK probably best portrays the impact of welfare state retrenchment on poverty and social exclusion, and therefore the role of FBOs in combating them. Although poverty is not just an urban phenomenon, it tends to concentrate in urban agglomerations.
Dramatic cuts in legal status of asylum seekers and new restrictive and discriminatory policy regulations have increased the importance of some poverty issues among this population. Although poverty has been reduced in absolute terms, it has increased in relative terms. Causes of poverty have been tackled with different degrees of success by public authorities. Poverty is regarded as an individual state and tends to blame the person as incapable or unwilling to integrate or move out of deprivation.
Poverty affects families, single mother households and communities. Neo-liberal approaches have a big impact on the transformation of the Third Sector, both from an organisational point of view and the dimension of increased competition. Anti-poverty policies and the role of FBOs are influenced by the generosity of the regime when it comes to establish who is in and who is not. The German research team provided two illustrations. One concerns public-private partnerships: the Cologne Sozialraumourientierung.
The project targets vulnerable areas and allocates a budget to enhance community development and area activation, cooperation and participation. Other examples of anti-poverty policies are area-based policies. The wide responsibilities of regional, provincial and local governments in Sweden have restricted FBOs to areas that the public sector does not reach.
Despite public administration still funding the main body of social actions developed by FBOs, the scenario has changed with both the introduction of competition laws that have enhanced the public sector to intervene and with the literal privatisation of the public sector welfare agencies. There is a tradition of area-based policies with an integral approach, which is facing the challenge of worsening social conditions. The fact that local authorities have wide powers over social welfare policy implies that the definition of needs and strategies might rely on the views of the party in office.
Belgium has a centralised welfare service provision centred around Public Centres for Social Welfare present in every municipality. Information, eligibility and stigmatisation are barriers to benefit from social services. Belgium has not gone through the process of welfare service outsourcing, mainly because pillarised civil society organisations play a major role.
The public welfare system relies on the third sector to cover the needs of those who are out of the system. In the Netherlands, anti-poverty policies are designed and implemented at the municipal level, although districts reinforce the strategies with prevention and with enhancing the accessibility to programmes. Each city has its own policy style and different strategies to tackle poverty.
Dutch welfare is comprehensive for those who are in, but marginalises those who are out. FBOs play a key role as welfare deliverers to these groups. The central level has initiated big city regeneration programmes that target vulnerable neighbourhoods with an integrated approach. The symptoms of "social exclusion" include long-term unemployment; informalization of work; a widening gap in levels of income, education and health; and changing family structure.
This is heightened, asserts the editor, by planning and housing policies, which often create whole neighbourhoods of disadvantaged people. Comparative studies of communities responding to social exclusion lead to proposals for urban regeneration schemes linking housing with employment as part of a Europe-wide initiative to combat the problem. Convert currency.
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