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Contents

  1. Quitting Smoking Timeline - Short-Term and Long-Term Effects
  2. Quitting Smoking Timeline
  3. Long Term Effects
  4. The World as Will and Representation/Supplements to the Fourth Book

Certainly in the- sense in which, when he is begotten, the man arises out of nothing, he becomes nothing through death. We are already led to this insight by the observation that all qualities of the parents recur in the children, thus have overcome death. Of this, however, I will speak in a special chapter. And if from this point of view we watch in a purely objective manner the immediate events of life, the Nunc stans becomes clear. To the eye of a being of incomparably longer life, which at one glance comprehended the human race in its whole duration, the constant alternation of birth and death.

We will have false conceptions of the indestructibility of our true nature by death, so long as we do not make up our minds to study it primarily in the brutes, but claim for ourselves alone a class apart from them, under the boastful name of immortality. But it is this denial of the truth which more than anything else closes against them the path to real knowledge of the indestructibility of our nature.

For if we seek anything upon a wrong path, we have just on that account forsaken the right path, and upon the path we follow we will never attain to anything in the end but late disillusion. Up, then, follow the truth, not according to preconceived notions, but as nature leads! First of al learn to recognise in the aspect of every young animal the existence of the species that never grows old, which, as a reflection of its eternal youth, imparts to every individual a temporary youth, and lets it come forth as new and fresh as if the world were of to-day.

Let one ask himself honestly whether the swallow of this year s spring is abso lutely a different one from the swallow of the first spring. This depends upon the fact that in this animal the in finite nature of its Idea species is imprinted in the finiteness of the individual. For in a certain sense it is of course true that in the individual we always have before us another being in the sense which depends upon the principle of sufficient reason, in which are also included time and space, which constitute the principium individua- tionis.

But, as was said, the contemplation of every animal teaches that death is no obstacle to the kernel of life, to the will in its manifestation. What an unfathomable mystery lies, then, in every animal! Many thousands of dogs have had to die before it came to this one s turn to live.

But the death of these thousands has not affected the Idea of the dog; it has not been in the least disturbed by all that Therefore the dog exists as fresh and endowed with primitive force as if this were its first day and none could ever be its last; and out of its eyes there shines he indestructible principle in it, the archaus. What then, has died during those thousands of years? Not the dog-it stands unscathed before us; merely its shadow, its image in our form of knowledge, which is bound to time Yet how can one even believe that that passes away which for ever and ever exists and fills all time?

Cer tainly the matter can be explained empirically; in pro portion as death destroyed the individuals, generation produced new ones. The metaphysical understanding of the matter, although not to be got so cheaply, is yet the only true and satisfying one. Kant, in his subjective procedure, brought to light the truth that time cannot belong to the thing in itself, be cause it lies pre-formed in our apprehension. But I, here upon the objective path, am trying to show the positive side of the matter, that the thing in itself remains untouched by time, and by that which is only possible through time, arising and passing away, and that the phenomena in time could not have even that ceaselessly fleeting exist ence which stands next to nothingness, if there were not in them a kernel of the infinite.

Eternity is certainly a conception which has no perception as its foundation; accordingly it has also a merely negative content; it signifies a timeless existence. For individual know ledge, on the other hand, thus in time, the Idea presents itself under the form of the species, which is the Idea broken up through its entrance into time.

Therefore the species is the most immediate objectification of the thing. The inmost nature of every brute, and also of man, accordingly lies in the. Therefore a glaring contrast appears between its niggardliness in the endowment of the individuals and its prodigality when the species is concerned.

In the former case, on the contrary, only barely enough in the way of powers and organs is given to each to enable it with ceaseless effort to maintain its life. And, therefore, if an animal is injured or weakened it must, as a rule, starve. And where an incidental saving was possible, through the circumstance that one part could upon necessity be dispensed with, it has been withheld, even out of order. Hence they often miss their food which is to be found close by.

But this happens in consequence of the lex parsimonice nativrce, to the expression of which natura nihil facit supervacaneum one may add et nihil largitur. The same tendency of nature shows itself also in the fact that the. If now we cast another glance at the scale of existences, with the whole of their accompanying gradations of con sciousness, from the polyp up to man, we see this wonder ful pyramid, kept in ceaseless oscillation certainly by the constant death of the individuals, yet by means of the bond of generation, enduring in the species through the infinite course of time.

While, then, as was explained above, the objective, the species, presents itself as inde structible, the subjective, which consists merely in the self- consciousness of these beings, seems to be of the shortest duration, and to be unceasingly destroyed, in order, just as often, to come forth again from nothing in an incom prehensible manner. But, indeed, one must be very short-sighted to let oneself be deceived by this appear ance, and not to comprehend that, although the form of temporal permanence only belongs to the objective, the subjective, i. For clearly the former as a manifestation presupposes something which manifests itself, as being for other presupposes a being for self, and as object presupposes a subject; and not conversely: because everywhere the root of things must.

Accordingly we found in the first book that the right starting-point for philosophy is essentially and necessarily the subjective, te. For any one who could bring this unity of being to distinct consciousness, the difference between the con tinuance of the external world after his death and his OWL continuance after death would vanish. Meanwhile one may obtain light upon what is said here by a peculiar experi ment, performed by means of the imagination, an experi ment which might be called metaphysical.

Let any one try to present vividly to his mind the time, in any case not far distant, when he will be dead. For he intended to present the world to his mind without himself; but the ego is the immediate element in consciousness, through which alone the world is brought about, and for which alone it exists.

Quitting Smoking Timeline - Short-Term and Long-Term Effects

The endeavour to accomplish this, the attempt to think the secondary without the primary, the conditioned without the condition, that which is sup ported without the supporter, always fails, much in the. Instead of what was intended, the feeling here presses upon us that the world is not less in us than we in it, and that the source of all reality lies within us.

The deep conviction of the indestructibleness of our nature through death, which, as is also shown by the inevitable qualms of conscience at its approach, every one carries at the bottom of his heart, depends altogether upon the consciousness of the original and eternal nature of our being: therefore Spinoza expresses it thus: " Sentimus, experimurgiw, nos ceternos esse. But whoever. If the former is an actual arising out of nothing, then the latter is also an actual annihilation.

But in truth it is only by means of the eternity of our real being that we can conceive it as imperishable, and consequently this imperishableness is not temporal. The assumption that man is made out of nothing leads necessarily to the assumption that death is his absolute end. New Testament Christianity has such a doctrine because it is Indian in spirit, and therefore more than probably also of Indian origin, although only indirectly, through Egypt. But to the Jewish stem, upon which that Indian wisdom had to be grafted in the Holy Land, such a doctrine is as little suited as the freedom of the will to its determinism, or as.

It is always bad if one cannot be thoroughly original, and dare not carve out of the whole wood. Brahmanism and Buddhism, on the other hand, have quite consistently, besides the continued existence after death, an existence before birth to expiate the guilt of which we have this life.

Quitting Smoking Timeline

Moreover, how distinctly conscious they were of the necessary consistency in this is shown by the following passage from Colebrooke s " History of the Indian Philo sophy " in the " Transac. Whoever conceives his existence as merely accidental must certainly fear that he will lose it by death. On the other hand, whoever sees, even only in general, that his existence rests upon some kind of original necessity will not believe that this which has produced so wonder ful a thing is limited to such a brief span of time, but that it is active in every one.

But he will recognise his existence as necessary who reflects that up till now, when he exists, already an infinite time, thus also an infinity of changes, has ran its course, but in spite of this he yet exists; thus the whole range of all possible states has already exhausted itself without being able to destroy his existence. For the infinity of the time that has already elapsed, with the exhausted possibility of the events in it, guarantees that what exists, exists necessarily.

There fore every one must conceive himself as a necessary being, i. In this line of thought, then, really lies the only immanent proof of the imperishableness of our nature, i. If time, of its own resources,. But also: if it could lead us to destruction, we would already have long been no more.

From the fact that we now exist, it follows, if well considered, that we must at all times exist. Carefully considered, it is inconceivable that what once exists in all the strength of reality should ever become nothing, and then not be, through an infinite time. Hence has arisen the Christian doctrine of the restoration of all things, that of the Hindus of the constantly repeated creation of the world by Brahma, together with similar dogmas of the Greek philosophers.

It has been most distinctly set forth by Kant in his immortal doctrine of the ideality of time and the sole reality of the thing in itself. For it results from this that the really essential part of things, of man, of the world, lies per manently and enduringly in the Nunc stans, firm and immovable; and that the change of the phenomena and events is a mere consequence of our apprehension of them by means of our form of perception, which is time.

Ac cordingly, instead of saying to men, "Ye have arisen through birth, but are immortal," one ought to say to them, "Ye are not nothing," and teach them to un derstand this in the sense of the saying attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, " To jap ov det evrai " Quod enim est, erit semper , Stob. Eel, i. If, however, this does not succeed, but the anxious heart raises its old. Hast thou not within thee the valuable present, after which ye children of time so eagerly strive, now within, actually within?

And dost thou un derstand how thou hast attained to it? Knowest thou the paths which have led thee to it, that thou canst know they will be shut against thee by death? An existence of thyself after the destruction of thy body is not con ceivable by thee as possible; but can it be more incon ceivable to thee than thy present existence, and how thou hast attained to it? Why shouldst thou doubt but that the secret paths to this present, which stood open to thee, will also stand open to every future present?

If, then, considerations of this kind are at any rate adapted to awaken the conviction that there is something in us which death cannot destroy, this yet only takes place by raising us to a point of view from which birth is not the beginning of our existence. But from this it follows that what is proved to be indestructible by death is not properly the individual, which, moreover, as having arisen through generation, and having in itself the qualities of the father and mother, presents itself as a mere differ ence of the species, but as such can only be finite.

As, in accordance with this, the individual has no recollection of its existence before its birth, so it can have no remem brance of its present existence after death. Tor since he has no remembrance of an existence before birth, thus his consciousness begins with birth, he must accept his birth as an origination of his existence out of nothing. Accord ing as I understand this word I can pay, Death is my complete end;" or, "This my personal phenomenal exist ence is just as infinitely small a part of my true nature as I am of the world.

Our faculty of know ledge is directed entirely towards without, in accordance with the fact that it is the product of a brain function, which has arisen for the purpose" of mere self-mainte nance, thus Of the flftfl. Ti far pnnriflljfflfiflfr an j thn mtpfi 9lES-ntoefore U P his individuality, smile at the tenacity of his attachment to it, and say, " What is the loss of this indi viduality to me, who bear in myself the possibility of. To desire that the individuality should be immortal really means to wish to perpetuate an error infinitely.

This also finds confirmation in the fact that the great majority, indeed really all men, are so constituted that they could not be happy in whatever kind of world they might be placed. In proportion as such a world excluded want and hardship, they would become a prey to ennui, and in proportion as this was prevented, they would fall into want, misery, and suffering. To be transferred to another world and to have his whole nature changed are, at bottom, one and the same.

Upon this also ultimately rests that depen-. Accordingly here lies the point at which the transcendent philosophy links itself on to ethics. If one considers this one will find that the awaking from the dream of life is only possible through the disappearance along with it of its whole ground-warp also. But this is its organ itself, the intellect together with its forms, with which the dream would spin itself out with out end, so firmly is it incorporated with it. That which really dreamt this dream is yet different from it, and alone remains over.

On the other hand, the fear that with death all will be over may be compared to the case of one who imagines in a dream that there are only dreams without a dreamer. But now, after an individual consciousness has once been ended by death, would it even be desirable that it should be kindled again in order to continue for ever? The greater part of its content, nay, generally its whole content, is nothing but a stream of small, earthly, paltry thoughts and endless cares.

Let them, then, at last be stilled! But if here, as so often has happened, a continued existence of the individual consciousness should be desired, in order to connect with it a future reward or punishment, what would really be aimed at in this would simply be the compatibility of virtue and egoism. On the other hand, the conviction is well founded, which the sight of noble conduct calls forth, that the spirit of love, which enjoins one man to spare his enemy, and another to protect at the risk of his life some one whom he has never seen before, can never pass away and become nothing.

The most thorough answer to the question as to the continued existence of the individual after death lies in Kant s great doctrine of the ideality of time, which just here shows itself specially fruitful and rich in conse-. Beginning, ending, and continuing are conceptions which derive their significance simply and solely from time, and are therefore valid only under the presupposition of this.

Thus with reference to this knowledge alone do the conceptions of ceasing and continuing find application, not with reference to that which exhibits itself in these, the inner being of things in relation to which these concep tions have therefore no longer any meaning.

Long Term Effects

For this shows itself also in the fact that an answer to the question which arises from those time-conceptions is impossible, and every assertion of such an answer, whether upon one side or the other, is open to convincing objections. Ac cordingly something like an antinomy might certainly be set up here. But it would rest upon mere negations. In it one would deny two contradictorily opposite predicates of the subject of the judgment, but only because the whole category of these predicates would be inapplicable to that subject.

But if now one denies these two predi cates, not together, but separately, it appears as if the con tradictory opposite of the predicate which in each case is denied were proved of the subject of the judgment. This, however, depends upon the fact that here incommensurable quantities are compared, for the problem removes us to a scene where time is abolished, and yet asks about temporal properties which it is consequently equally false to attri-.

This just means the problem is transcendent. In this sense death remains a mystery. Thus this true being is indestructible, although, on account of the mnation of time-conceptions which is connected with it, we cannot attribute to it continuance. Accordingly wa would be led here to the conception of an indestructibility which would yet be no continuance. It is true that we have never asserted an absolute and exhaustive knowledge of the thing in itself, but rather have seen very well that it is impossible to know anything as it is abso lutely and m itself.

Therefore for a knovnng consciousness, however it may be constituted there can be always only phenomena. This is not entirely obviated even by the fact that it is my own nature which s known; for, since it falls within my knowing conscious- ness, it is already a reflex of my nature, something diffe rent from this itself, thus already in a certain degree phenomenon.

So far, then, as I am a knowing being I. For it is sufficiently proved in the second book that knowledge is only a secon dary property of our being, and introduced by its animal nature. Strictly speaking, then, we know even our own will always merely as phenomenon, and not as it may be absolutely in and for itself. But in that second book, and also in my work upon the will in nature, it is fully explained and proved that if, in order to penetrate into the inner nature of things, leaving what is given merely in directly and from without, we stick to the only phenome non into the nature of which an immediate insight from within is attainable, we find in this quite definitely, as the ultimate kernel of reality, the will, in which therefore we recognise the thing in itself in so far as it has here no longer space, although it still has time, for its form conse quently really only in its most immediate manifestation, and with the reservation that this knowledge of it is still not exhaustive and entirely adequate.

Thus in this sense we retain here also the conception of will as that of the thing in itself. The conception of ceasing to be is certainly applicable to man as a phenomenon in time, and empirical know ledge plainly presents death as the end of this temporal existence. The end of the person is just as real as was its beginning, and in the same sense as before birth we were not, after death we shall be no more. Yet no more can be destroyed by death than was produced by birth; thus not that through which birth first became possible.

In this sense natus et denatus is a beautiful expression. But now the whole of empirical knowledge affords us merely phenomena; therefore only phenomena are in volved in the temporal processes of coming into being and passing away, and not that which manifests itself in the phenomena, the thing in itself. For this the opposition of coming into being and passing away conditioned by the brain, does not exist at all, but has here lost meaning and significance. It thus remains untouched by the. Consciousness, on the other hand, consists in knowledge.

But knowledge, as activity of the brain, and consequently as function of the organism, belongs, as has been suffi ciently proved, to the mere phenomenon, and therefore ends with this. The will alone, whose work, or rather whose image was the body, is that which is indestructible.

The sharp distinction of will from knowledge, together with the primacy of the former, which constitutes the fundamental characteristic of my philosophy, is therefore the only key to the contradiction which presents itself in so many ways, and arises ever anew in every consciousness, even the most crude, that death is our end, and that yet we must be eternal and indestructible, thus the sentimus, experimurque nos ceternos esse of Spinoza. It lies exclusively in the will, which is entirely different from the intellect, and alone is original The intellect, as was most fully shown in the second book, is a secondary phenomenon, and conditioned by the brain, therefore be ginning and ending with this.

The will alone is that which conditions, the kernel of the whole phenomenon, consequently free from the forms of the phenomenon to which time belongs, thus also indestructible. Therefore a sure feeling informs every one that there is something in him which is ab solutely imperishable and indestructible. Indeed the freshness and vividness of memories of the most distant time, of earliest childhood, bears witness to the fact that.

But what this im perishable element is one could not make clear to oneself. It is not consciousness any more than it is the body upon which clearly consciousness depends. But it is just that which, when it appears in consciousness, presents itself as will. In the phenomenon, and by means of its forms, time and space, as principium individuationis, what presents itself is that the human individual perishes, while the human race, on the contrary, always remains and lives.

But in the true being of things, which is free from these forms, this whole distinction between the individual and the race also disappears, and the two are immediately one. The whole will to live is in the individual, as it is in the race, and therefore the continuance of the species is merely the image of the indestructibility of the iudi-.

Since, then, the infinitely important understanding of the indestructibility of our true nature by death depends entirely upon the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself, I wish now to bring this difference into the clearest light by explaining it in the opposite of death, thus in the origin of the animal existence, i. For this process, which is just as mysterious as death, presents to us most directly the fundamental opposition between the phenomenal appearance and the true being of things, i. Now, from the side of the will, thus inwardly, subjectively, for self-consciousness, that act presents itself as the most immediate and complete satisfaction of the will, i.

From the side of the idea, on the other hand, thus externally, objectively, for the consciousness of other things, this act is just the woof of the most cunning of webs, the foundation of the inexpressibly complicated animal organism, which then only requires to be developed to become visible to our astonished eyes. This organism, whose infinite complication and perfection is only known to him who has studied anatomy, cannot, from the side of the idea, be otherwise conceived and thought of than as a system devised with the most ingenious forethought and carried out with the most consummate skill and exactness, as the most arduous work of profound reflection.

But from the side of the will we know, through self-conscious ness, the production of this organism as the work of an act which is exactly the opposite of all reflection, an impetuous, blind impulse, an exceedingly pleasurable sensation. This opposition is closely related to the in finite contrast, which is shown above, between the ab solute facility with which nature produces its works, together with the correspondingly boundless carelessness with which it abandons them to destruction, and the incalculably ingenious and studied construction of these very works, judging from which they must have been infinitely difficult to make, and their maintenance should have been provided for with all conceivable care; while we have the opposite before our eyes.

If now by this certainly very unusual consideration, we have brought together in the boldest manner the two heterogeneous sides of the world, and, as it were, grasped them with one hand, we must now hold them fast in order to convince ourselves of the entire invalidity of the laws of the pheno menon, or the world as idea, for that of will, or the thing in itself. Then it will become more comprehensible to us. For, by going back to the root, where, by means of self-conscious ness, the phenomenon and the thing in itself meet, we have just, as it were, palpably apprehended that the two are absolutely incommensurable, and the whole manner of being of the one, together with all the fundamental laws of its being, signify nothing, and less than nothing, in the other.

I believe that this last consideration will only be rightly understood by a few, and that it will be displeasing and even offensive to all who do not understand it, but I shall never on this account omit anything that can serve to illustrate my fundamental thought. A,s we are allured into life by the wholly illusory inclination to sensual pleasure, so we are retained in it by the fear of death, which is certainly just as illusory, Both spring directly from the will, which in itself is unconscious.

If, on the contrary, man were merely a knowing being, then death would necessarily be to him not only indifferent, but even welcome. The reflection to which we have here attained now teaches that what is affected by death is merely the knowing consciousness, and the will, on the other hand, because it is the thing in itself, which lies at the foundation of every phenomenon, is free from all that depends upon temporal determinations, thus is also imperishable.

Its striving towards existence and mani-. From this now it follows that that in us which alone is capable of fearing death, and also alone fears it, the will, is not affected by it; and that, on the other hand, what is affected by it and really perishes is that which from its nature is capable of no fear, and in general of no desire or emotion, and is therefore indif ferent to being and not being, the mere subject of know ledge, the intellect, whose existence consists in its relation to the world of idea, i.

Thus, although the individual consciousness does not survive death, yet that survives it which alone struggles against it the will. It is also a result of the fact that only the will, arid not the intellect, is indestructible, that all religions and philosophies promise a reward in eternity only to the virtues of the will, or heart, not to those of the intellect, or head. The subject of knowledge, on the other hand, is a secondary phenomenon, arising from the objectification of the will;.

With this, then, it must perish. In self-consciousness, as that which alone knows, it stands over against the will as its spectator, and, although sprung from it, knows it as something different from itself, something foreign to it, and conse quently also only empirically, in time, by degrees, in its successive excitements and acts, and also learns its deci sions only a posteriori, and often very indirectly.

This explains the fact that our own nature is a riddle to us, i. As now the will does not know, so conversely the intellect, or the subject of knowledge, is simply and solely knowing, with out ever willing. This can be proved even physically in the fact that, as was already mentioned in the second book, according to Bichat, the various emotions directly affect all parts of the organism and disturb their functions, with the exception of the brain, which can only be affected by them very indirectly, i.

But from this it follows that the subject of knowledge, for itself and as such, cannot take part or interest in any thing, but for it the being or not being of everything, nay, even of its own self, is a matter of indifference. Now why should this purely neutral being be immortal? It ends with the temporal manifestation of the will, i. It is the lantern which is extinguished when it has served its end. Therefore the intellect depends. Death and birth are the constant renewal of the consciousness of the will, in itself without end and without beginning, which alone is, as it were, the substance of existence but each such renewal brings a new pos sibility of the denial of the will to live.

Consciousness is the life of the subject of knowledge, or the brain, and death is its end. And therefore, finally, consciousness is always new, in each case beginning at the beginning. The knowing subject for itself is not concerned about anything. In the ego, however, the two are bound up to gether. In every animal existence the will has achieved an intellect which is the light by which it here pursues its ends.

It may be remarked by the way that the fear of death may also partly depend upon the fact that the individual will is so loath to separate from the intellect which has fallen to its lot through the course of nature, its guide and guard, without which it knows that it is helpless and blind. The terrors of death depend for the most part upon the false illusion that now the ego vanishes and the world remains. With the braiu the intellect perishes, and with the intellect the objective world, its mere idea. I That in other brains, afterwards aa before, a similar world lives and moves is, with reference to the intellect which perishes, a matter of indifference.

If, therefore, reality proper did not lie in the will, and if the moral existence were not that which extends beyond death, then, since the intellect, and with it its world, is extinguished, the true nature of things in general would be no more than an endless succession of short and troubled dreams, without connection among themselves; for the permanence of unconscious nature consists merely in the idea of time of conscious nature. Thus a world- spirit dreaming without end or aim, dreams which for the most part are very troubled and heavy, would then be all in all.

Yet it is he who desponds in the individual who suffers from the fear of death, for he is exposed to the illusion produced by the principium individuationis that his existence is limited to the nature which is now dying. This illusion belongs to the heavy dream into which, as the will to live, he has fallen. So long as no denial of the will takes place, what death leaves untouched is the germ and kernel of quite another existence, in which a new individual finds itself again, so.

What sleep is for the individual, death is for the will as thing in itself. It would not endure to continue the same actions and sufferings throughout an eternitv without true gain, if memory and individuality remained to it. As the self-asserting will to live man has the root oLJiis. F Tor "in this alone lies the Sstgrnal power which couIcTpfoduce its existence with its ego, yet, on account of its nature, was not able to maintain it in existence.

But an infinite number of such existences, each with its ego, stands within reach of this power, thus of the will, which, however, will again prove just as transitory and perish able. Since now every ego has its separate consciousness, that infinite number of them is, with reference to such an ego, not different from a single one. From this point of view it appears to me not accidental that cevum, almv, signifies both the individual term of life and infinite time. But it belongs to the unalterable limitations of our intellect that it can never entirely cast off this first and most immediate form of all its ideas, in order to operate without it.

If, indeed, we now call in the assistance of the fact, to be explained in chapter 43, that the character, i. In accordance with this, this doctrine is more correctly denoted by the word palingenesis than by me tempsychosis. These constant new births, then, constitute the succession of the life-dreams of a will which in itself is indestructible, until, instructed and improved by so much and such various successive knowledge in a con stantly new form, it abolishes or abrogates itself.

The true and, so to speak, esoteric doctrine of Buddhism, as we have come to know it through the latest investiga-. This may be seen from the exposition of the subject, well worth reading and pondering, which is given in Spence Hardy s " Manual of Buddhism," pp. The very useful German compendium of Buddhism by Koppen is also right upon this point. Besides, it must not be neglected that even empirical grounds support a palingenesis of this kind. As a matter of fact there does exist a connection between the birth of the newly appearing beings and the death of those that are worn out.

It shows itself in the great fruitfulness of the human race which appears as a consequence of de vastating diseases. This is related by F. Schnurrer, " Chronik der Seuchen," And yet it is impossible that there can be a physical causal connection between my early death and the fruitfulness of a marriage with which I have nothing to do, or conversely.

Thus here the metaphysical appears undeniably and in a stupendous manner as the im mediate ground of explanation of the physical. To show the bridge between the two would certainly be the solution of a great riddle. The great truth which is expressed here, has never been entirely unacknowledged, although it could not be reduced to its exact and correct meaning, which is only possible through the doctrine of the primacy and metaphysical nature of the will and the secondary, merely organic nature of the intel lect.

We find the infitofi. Accordingly, while Christians console themselves with the thought of meeting again in another world, in which one regains one s com plete personality and knows oneself at once, in those other religions the meeting again is already going on now, only incognito. In the succession of births, and by virtue of metempsychosis or palingenesis, the persons who now stand in close connection or contact with us will also be born along with us at the next birth, and will have the same or analogous relations and sentiments towards us as now, whether these are of a friendly or a hostile descrip-.

The question simply is in what this true being consists.

Long Term Effects

The answer which my doctrine gives to this question is well known. The intuitive conviction referred to may be conceived as arising from the fact that the multiplying-glasses, time and space, lose for a moment their effect. With refer ence to the universality of the belief in metempsychosis, Obry says rightly, in his excellent book, " Du Nirvana Indien" p. Burnet, dans Beausobre, Hist, du Manichdisme, ii. Taught already in the " Vedas," as in all the sacred books of India, metempsychosis is well known to be the kernel of Brahmanism and Buddhism. It accordingly prevails at the present day in the whole of non-Mohammedan Asia, thus among more than half of the whole human race, as the firmest conviction, and with an incredibly strong practical influence.

It was also the belief of the Egyptians Herod. That it was also taught in the mysteries. Nemesius indeed De not. The " Edda " also, especially in the " Voluspa," teaches metempsychosis. Not less was it the foundation of the religion of the Druids Cces. Pictet, Le mystere des Bardes de I ile de Bre- tagne, Also among American Indians and negro tribes, nay, even among the natives of Australia, traces of this belief are found, as appears from a minute description given in the Times of 2Qth January of the execu tion of two Australian savages for arson and murder.

According to all this, the belief in metempsychosis presents itself as the natural conviction of man, whenever he reflects at all in an unprejudiced manner. I have also remarked that it is at once obvious to every one who hears of it for the first time. Let any one only. Yet how difficult this was is shown by the oldest Church histories. The Jews themselves have in part fallen into it, as Tertullian and Justinus in his dialogues inform us ID the Talmud it is related that Abel s soul passed into the body of Seth, arid then into that of Moses.

Even the pas sage of the Bible, Matt. Luke, it is true who also has the passage ix. In Christianity, however, the doctrine of original sin, i. Egoism consists really in the fact that man limits all reality to his own person, in that he imagines that he lives in this alone and not in others. We call to mind. I have worked this out in my prizn essay on the foundation of morals. According to what was said above, the degree in which death can be regarded as the annihilation of the man is in proportion to this differ ence.

But if we start from the fact that the distinction of outside me and in me, as a spatial distinction, is only founded in the phenomenon, not in the thing in itself, thus is no absolutely real distinction, then we shall see in the losing of our own individuality only the loss of a phenomenon, thus only an apparent loss. However much reality that distinction has in the empirical consciousness, yet from the metaphysical standpoint the propositions, " I perish, but the world endures," and " The world perishes but Ijmdure. If now he were to go on living he would go on acting in the same way, on account of tlje unalterable nature of his character.

Accordingly he must cease to be what he is in order to be able to arise out of. Wiudisch- laneous Essays," vol. The true original freedom re- enters at this moment, which, in the sense indicated, may be regarded as a restitutio in integrum. The peace and quietness upon the countenance of most dead persons seems to have its origin in this. For only he wills to die really, and not merely appa rently, and consequently he needs and desires no continu ance of his person. The Buddhist faith calls it Nirvana, 1 i.

IN the preceding chapter it was called to mind that the Platonic Ideas of the different grades of beings, which are the adequate objectification of the will to live, exhibit themselves in the knowledge of the individual, which is bound to the form of time, as the species, i. Now, although the will only attains to self-con sciousness in the individual, thus knows itself immediately only as the individual, yet the deep-seated consciousness that it is really the species in which his true nature objectifies itself appears in the fact that for the individual the concerns of the species as such, thus the relations of the sexes, the production and nourishment of the offspring are of incomparably greater importance and consequence than everything else.

Hence, then, arises in the case of the brutes, heat or rut an excellent description of the vehemence of which will be found in Burdach s " Physio logy," vol. In the supplements to the second book the will was compared to the root and the intellect to the crown of the tree; and this is the case inwardly or psychologically. But outwardly or physiologically the genitals are the root and the head the crown. For physically the individual is a production of the species, metaphysically a more or less perfect picture of the Idea, which, in the form of time, exhibits itself as species.

In agreement with the relation expressed here, the greatest vitality, and also the decrepi tude of the brain and the genital organs, is simultaneous and stands in connection. That the service of the species, i. But this is to be explained from the fact that the metaphysical substratum of life reveals itself directly in the species and only by means of this in the individual.

Accordingly the Lingam with the Yoni, as the symbol of the species and its immortality, is worshipped in India, and, as the counterpoise of death, is ascribed as an attribute to the very divinity who presides over death, Siva. But without myth or symbol, the vehemence of the sexual impulse, the keen intentness and profound serious ness with which every animal, including man, pursues its concerns, shows that it is through the function which serves it that the animal belongs to that in which really and principally its true being lies, the species; while all other functions and organs directly serve only the indivi dual, whose existence is at bottom merely secondary.

In the vehemence of that impulse, which is the concentra tion of the whole animal nature, the consciousness further expresses itself that the individual does not endure, and therefore all must be staked on the maintenance of the species, in which its true existence lies. To illustrate what has been said, let us now imagine a brute in rut, and in the act of generation.

We see a seriousness and intentness never known in it at any other time. Now what goes on in it? Does it know that it must die, and that through its present occupation a new individual, which yet entirely resembles itself, will arise in order to take its place? Of all this it knows nothing, for it does not think. But it is as intently careful for the continuance of the species in time as if it knew all that. On this account the will does not require to be guided by knowledge throughout; but whenever in its primitive originality it has resolved, this volition will objectify itself of its own accord in the world of the idea.

If now in this way it is that definite animal form which we have thought of that wills life and existence, it does not will life and existence in general, but in this particular form. Therefore it is the sight of its form in the female of its species that stimu lates the will of the brute to the act of generation. This volition of the brute, when regarded from without and under the form of time, presents itself as such an animal form maintained through an infinite time by the con stantly repeated replacement of one individual by another, thus by the alternation of death and reproduction, which so regarded appear only as the pulse-beats of that form tSea, et So?

They may be compared to the forces of attraction and repulsion in which matter consists. It is accordingly to be reckoned among instinctive actions. For in reproduction the brute is just as little guided by knowledge of the end as in mechanical in stincts; in these also the will manifests itself, in the main, without the mediation of knowledge, which here, as there, is only concerned with details.

Reproduction is, to a certain extent, the most marvellous of all instincts, and its work the most astonishing. It is everywhere tacitly assumed as necessary and inevitable, and is not, like other desires, a matter of taste and disposition. For it is the desire which. In conflict with it no motive is so strong that it would be certain of victory. On the other hand, the excessive power of the sexual passion is seriously and worthily expressed in the inscription which according to Theon of Smyrna, De Musica, c.

To all this corresponds the important rdle which the relation of the sexes plays in the world of men, where it is really the invisible central point of all action and conduct, and peeps out everywhere in spite of all veils thrown over it. It is the cause of war and the end of peace, the basis of what is serious, and the aim of the jest, the inexhaustible source of wit, the key to all allusions, and the meaning of all mysterious hints, of all unspoken offers and all stolen glances, the daily medita tion of the young, and often also of the old, the hourly thought of the unchaste, and even against their will the constantly recurring imagination of the chaste, the ever ready material of a joke, just because the profoundest seriousness lies at its foundation.

It is, however, the piquant element and the joke of life that the chief con cern of all men is secretly pursued and ostensibly ignored. But, in fact, we see it every moment seat itself, as the true and hereditary lord of the world, out of the fulness of its own strength, upon the ancestral throne, and looking down from thence with scornful glances, laugh at the preparations which have been made to bind it, imprison it, or at least to limit it and wherever it is possible to keep it concealed, or even so to master it that it shall only appear as a subordinate, secondary concern of life.

Therefore sexual passion is the most perfect manifestation of the will to live, its most distinctly expressed type; and the origin of the individual in it, and its primacy over all other desires of the natural man, are both in complete agreement with this.

One other remark of a physiological nature is in place here, a remark which throws light upon my fundamental doctrine expounded in the second book. As the sexual impulse is the most vehement of desires, the wish of wishes, the concentration of all our volition, and accord ingly the satisfaction of it which exactly corresponds to the individual wish of any one, that is, the desire fixed upon a definite individual, is the summit and crown of his happiness, the ultimate goal of his natural endeavours, with the attainment of which everything seems to him to.

Accordingly the love of the brute for its young has, like the sexual impulse, a strength which far surpasses that of the efforts which merely concerns itself as an individual. This shows itself in the fact that even the mildest animals are ready to undertake for the sake of their young even the most unequal battle for life and death, and with almost all species of animals the mother encounters any danger for the protection of her young, nay, in many cases even faces certain death. In the case of man this instinctive parental love is guided and directed by reason, i. Sometimes, how ever, it is also in this way restricted, and with bad charac ters this may extend to the complete repudiation of it.

Therefore we can observe its effects most purely in the lower animals. Thus, for example, the French newspapers have just announced that at Cahors, in the department of Lot, a father has taken his own life in order that his son, who had been drawn for military service, should be the eldest son of a widow, and therefore exempt Galignanis Mes senger of 22d June Yet in the case of the lower animals, since they are capable of no reflection, the in stinctive maternal affection the male is generally ignorant. At bottom it is the expression of the conscious ness in the brute that its true being lies more immediately in the species than in the individual, and therefore, when necessary, it sacrifices its life that the species may be main tained in the young.

Thus here, as also in the sexual impulse, the will to live becomes to a certain extent transcendent, for its consciousness extends beyond the individual, in which it is inherent, to the species. In order to avoid expressing this second manifestation of the life of the species in a merely abstract manner, and to present it to the reader in its magnitude and reality, I will give a few examples of the extraordinary strength of instinctive maternal affection.

At Three Kings Island, near New Zealand, there are colossal seals called sea-elephants phoca proboscidea. Thus they all fast together for between seven and eight weeks, and all become very thin, simply in order that the young may not enter the sea before they. We also see here how parental affection, like every strong exertion of the will cf.

Wild ducks, white-throats, and many other birds, when the sportsman comes near their nest, fly in front of him with loud cries and flap about as if their wings were injured, in order to attract his attention from their young to themselves. The lark tries to entice the dog away from its nest by exposing itself. In the same way hinds and does induce the hunter to pursue them in order that their young may not be attacked. Swallows have flown into burning houses to rescue their young or perish with them.

At Delfft, in a great fire, a stork allowed itself to be burnt in its nest rather than forsake its tender young, which could not yet fly Hadr. Junius, Descriptio Hollandice. Mountain-cocks and woodcocks allow themselves to be taken upon the nest when brooding. Muscicapa tyrannus protects its nest with remarkable courage, and defends itself against eagles. An ant has been cut in two, and the fore half been seen to bring the pupse to a place of safety. A bitch whose litter had been cut out of her belly crept up to them dying, caressed them, and began to whine violently only when they were taken from her Burdach, Physiologie aLt Erfahrungswissenschaft, vol.

The dealer who sells you a dangerous counterfeit of DeWitt s Witch Hazel Salve risks your life to make a little larger profit. You cannot trust him. Dewitt's is the only genuine and orig inal Witch Hazel Salve, a well known cure for piles and all skin diseases. See that your dealer gives you De Witt's Salve.

Evans' Pharmacy. Pratt, Cave, S. Z caused by impure blood. It ls i m pos- now uel sible to describe my suffering ; part of S. It is a 1 During the summer of 18SS 1 was per- nrfl.. Send for our 1 Cotton Plant By-Product. Other by products of cotton plant! One of these is the use I of the fiber of the stalk for the manu-! According to The , Scientific American, a machine has been perfected for working the stalks J into bagging. Some of this cotton stalk bagging has been tested aud pro nounced excellent for the purpose.

It is strong and clean, and does not readily ignite. Five tons of good j stalk will yield about 1,51 0 pouuds of I first-class fiber. At this rate the an- nual crop will produce all the bagging needed to wrap the lint ami leave a surplus to be devoted to other pur- j poses. It is predicted that machinery j for making coarse matting from the fibre will be produced shortly.

The Scientific American expresses thc opinion that if thc experiments which are now being made with the fiber are successful, "it will not be many years before the industry will assume gigan tic proportions. The root of therEgyptian cotton plant yields a drug that has the properties of ergot; and the American plant, under a chemical manipulation, has yielded a similar product.

This has not yet been fully developed. A difference has been detected in the properties of the roots of different kinds of cotton, long staple and short staple, he:ice it is probable that many drugs may bc extracted from the different varieties of roots.


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