Retrospection and Introspection (Authorized Edition)
Other accounts of self-knowledge to be discussed later in Section 2. Armstrong , , is perhaps the leading defender of a quasi-perceptual, self-detection account of introspection. Armstrong also appears to hold that the quasi-perceptual introspective process proceeds at a fairly low level cognitively—quick and simple, typically without much interference by or influence from other cognitive or sensory processes. Since Armstrong allows that inferences are often non-conscious, based on sensory or other cues that the inferring person cannot herself discern, his claim that the introspective process is non-inferential is a substantial commitment to the simplicity of the process.
He contrasts this reflexive self-monitoring with more sophisticated acts of deliberate introspection which he thinks are also possible , Lycan endorses a similar view, though unlike Armstrong, Lycan characterizes introspection as involving attentional mechanisms, thus presumably treating introspection as more demanding of cognitive resources though still perhaps nearly constant.
Nichols and Stich also propose an analogous but somewhat more complicated mechanism they leave the details unspecified that takes percepts as its input and produces beliefs about those percepts as its output. Nichols and Stich emphasize that this Monitoring Mechanism does not operate in isolation, but often co-operates or competes with a second means of acquiring self-knowledge, which involves deploying theories along the lines suggested by Gopnik see Section 2.
That is, they present, on the one hand, cases which they interpret as cases showing a breakdown in the Monitoring Mechanism, while the capacity for theoretical inference about the mind remains intact and, on the other hand, cases in which the capacity for theoretical inference about the mind is impaired but the Monitoring Mechanism continues to function normally, suggesting that theoretical inference and self-monitoring are distinct and separable processes. Conversely, Nichols and Stich argue that schizophrenic people remain excellent theorizers about mental states but monitor their own mental states very poorly—for example, when they fail to recognize certain actions as their own and struggle to report, or deny the existence of, ongoing thoughts.
Goldman criticizes the account of Nichols and Stich see Section 2. But functional role is a matter of what is apt to cause a particular mental state and what that mental state is apt to cause see the entry on functionalism , and Goldman argues that a simple mechanism could not discern such dispositional and relational facts though Nichols and Stich might be able to avoid this concern by describing introspection as involving not just one but rather a cluster of similar mechanisms: , Goldman also argues that the Nichols and Stich account leaves unclear how we can discern the strength or intensity of our beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes.
Individual attended mental states are then classified into broad categories similarly, in visual perception we can classify seen objects into broad categories. Specific contents, especially of attitudes like belief, are too manifold, Goldman suggests, for pre-existing classificational categories to exist for each one. Visual representations, he suggests, have a different format or mental code than beliefs, and therefore cognitive work will be necessary to translate the fine-grained detail of visual experience into mental contents that can be believed introspectively.
Hill , also offers a multi-process self-detection account of introspection. Like Goldman, Hill sees attention in some broad, non-sensory sense as central to introspection, though he also allows for introspective awareness without attention , — Hill emphasizes dissimilarities between introspection and perception, while retaining a broadly self-detection account. Hill argues that introspection is a process that produces judgments about , rather than perceptual awareness of, the target states, and suggests that the processes that generate these judgments vary considerably, depending on the target state, and are often complex.
Central to Hill's account is an emphasis on the capacity of introspective attention to transform—especially to amplify and enrich, even to create—the target experience. Like Hill, Prinz argues that introspection must involve multiple mechanisms, depending both on the target states e. The latter type of knowledge, Prinz argues, is much more detailed and finely structured than the former but cannot be expressed or retained over time. Prinz also follows Hill in emphasizing that introspection often intensifies or otherwise modifies the target experience.
There are several ways to generate judgments, or at least statements, about one's own current mental life—self-ascriptions, let's call them—that are reliably true though they do not involve the detection of a pre-existing state. Consider the following four types of case:. Or: I judge that I am making a judgment about my own mental life. Such self-ascriptions are automatically self-fulfilling.
Their existence conditions are a subset of their truth conditions. Self-ascriptions that prompt self-shaping : I declare that I have a mental image of a pink elephant. At the same time I make this declaration, I deliberately cause myself to form the mental image of a pink elephant.
Or: A man uninitiated in romantic love declares to a prospective lover that he is the kind of person who sends flowers to his lovers. At the same time he says this, he successfully resolves to be the kind of person who sends flowers to his lovers. The self-ascription either precipitates a change or buttresses what already exists in such a way as to make the self-ascription accurate. In these cases, unlike the cases described in A , some change or self-maintenance is necessary to render the self-ascription true, beyond the self-ascriptional event itself.
Self-expressions of this sort are assumed here to flow naturally from the states expressed in roughly the same way that facial expressions and non-self-attributive verbal expressions flow naturally from those same states—that is, without being preceded by any attempt to detect the state self-ascribed. Self-ascriptions derived from judgments about the outside world : From the non-self-attributive fact that Stanford is south of Berkeley I derive the self-attributive conclusion that I believe that Stanford is south of Berkeley. Or: From the non-self-attributive fact that it would be good to go to home now, I derive the self-attributive judgment that I want to go home now.
These derivations may be inferences, but if so, such inferences require no specific premises about ongoing mental states. The following accounts of self-knowledge all take advantage of one or more of these facts about self-ascription. Because these ways of obtaining self-knowledge all violate the detection condition on introspection condition 5 in Section 1. An emphasis on infallible knowledge through self-fulfilling self-ascriptions goes back at least to Augustine c.
Contemporary self-fulfillment accounts tend to exploit the idea of containment. In a essay, Burge writes:. Heil ; Gertler , ; Heil and Gertler describe such thoughts as introspective while Burge appears not to think of self-knowledge so structured as introspective: , ; see also , In judging that I am thinking of a banana, I thereby necessarily think of a banana: The self-attributive judgment contains, as a part, the very thought self-ascribed, and thus cannot be false. Shoemaker a, b, c deploys the containment idea very differently, and over a much wider array of introspective targets, including conscious states like pains and propositional attitudes like belief.
Shoemaker speculates that the relevant containment relation holds not between the contents or concepts employed in the target state and in the self-ascriptive state but rather between their neural realizations in the brain. One might think of mental processes as transpiring in fairly narrow regions of the brain their core realization , and yet, Shoemaker suggests, it's not as though we could simply carve off those regions from all others and still have the mental state in question. To be the mental state it is, the process must be embedded in a larger causal network involving more of the brain the total realization.
Relationships of containment or overlap between core realization and total realization between the target state and the self-ascriptive judgment might then underwrite introspective accuracy. For example, the total brain-state realization of the state of pain may simply be a subset of the total brain-state realization of the state of believing that one is in pain.summit.vvinners.com/xivib-de-los.php
Retrospection and Introspection by Eddy Mary Baker G - AbeBooks
Introspective accuracy might then be explained by the fact that the introspective judgment is not an independently existing state. One possible difficulty with such accounts is that while it seems plausible to suppose that an introspective thought or judgment might contain another thought or judgment as a part, it's less clear how a self-attributive judgment or belief might contain a piece of conscious experience as a part.
Beliefs, and other belief-like mental states like judgments, one might think, contain concepts , not conscious experiences, as their constituents Fodor ; or, alternatively, one might think that beliefs are functional or dispositional patterns of response to input Dennett ; Schwitzgebel , again rendering it unclear how a piece of phenomenology could be part of belief.
Such concepts are often thought to be obtained by demonstrative attention to our conscious experiences as they are ongoing. It would seem, at least, that beliefs, concepts, or judgments containing pieces of phenomenology would have to expire once the phenomenology has passed and thus that the introspective judgments could not used in later inferences without recreating the state in question. Chalmers concedes the temporal locality of such phenomenology-containing introspective judgments and consequently their limited use in speech and in making generalizations.
Papineau , in contrast, embraces a theory in which the imaginative recreation of phenomenology in thinking about past experience is commonplace. Although we can seemingly at least sometimes arrive at true self ascriptions through the self-shaping and the self-expression procedures B and C described at the beginning of Section 2. It is difficult to find accounts of self-knowledge that stress the self-shaping technique in its purest, forward-looking, causal form—perhaps because it's clear that self-knowledge must involve considerably more than this Gertler If I describe myself as brave in battle, or as a committed vegetarian—especially if I do so publicly—I create commitments and expectations for myself that help to make those self-ascriptions true.
McGeer compares self-knowledge to the knowledge a driver has, as opposed to a passenger, of where the car is going: The driver, unlike the passenger, can make it the case that the car goes where she says it is going There are also strains in Dennett though Dennett may not have an entirely consistent view on these matters; see Schwitzgebel that suggest either a self-fulfillment or a self-shaping view.
Such remarks are consistent with either an anti-realist view of fiction there are no facts about the easy chair or about consciousness; see — or a self-fulfillment or self-shaping realist view Doyle creates facts about Holmes as he thinks or writes about him; we create facts about what it's like to be us in thinking or making claims about our consciousness, as perhaps on 81 and More moderately, in discussing attitudes, Dennett emphasizes how the act of formulating an attitude in language—for example, when ordering a menu item—can involve self-attributing a degree of specification in one's attitudes that was not present before, thereby committing one to, and partially or wholly creating, the specific attitude self-ascribed , On Wittgenstein's view, it is both true that I am in pain and that I say of myself that I am in pain, but the utterance in no way emerges from a process of detecting one's pain.
A simple expressivist view—sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein on the basis of these and related passages—denies that the expressive utterances e. Such a view faces serious difficulties accommodating the evident semantics of self-ascriptive utterances, including their use in inference and the apparent symmetries between present-tense and past-tense uses and between first-person and third-person uses Wright ; Bar-On Consequently, Bar-On advocates, instead, what she calls a neo-expressivist view according to which expressive utterances can share logical and semantic structure with non-expressive utterances, despite the epistemic differences between them.
Expressivists have not always been clear about exactly the range of target mental states expressible in this way, but it seems plausible that at least in principle some true or apt self-ascriptions could arise in this manner, with no intervening introspective self-detection. The question would then be whether this is how we generally arrive at true self-ascriptions, for some particular class of mental states, or whether some more archetypically introspective process is also available.
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For a more detailed treatment of expressivism, consult the section about the expressivist model of self-knowledge in the entry self-knowledge. Transparency approaches to self-knowledge, like Evans', emphasize cases in which it seems that one arrives at an accurate self-ascription not by means of attending to, or thinking about, one's own mental states, but rather by means of attending to or thinking about the external states of the world that the target mental states are about.
Note that this claim has both a negative and a positive aspect: We do not learn about our minds by as it were gazing inward; and we do learn about our minds by reflecting on the aspects of the world that our mental states are about. This is a completely different usage, not to be confused with the present usage.
Nonetheless, some prominent advocates of transparency accounts, such as Dretske and Tye , offer them explicitly as accounts of introspection. The range of target states to which transparency applies is a matter of some dispute. Perceptual states or perceptual experiences are also often regarded as transparent in the relevant sense.
Harman's example is the most cited:. Harman's emphasis here is on the negative thesis, which goes back at least to Moore ; though Moore does not unambiguously endorse it. The view that it is impossible to attend directly to perceptual experience has recently been especially stressed by Tye , , ; see also Evans ; Van Gulick ; Shoemaker a; Dretske ; Martin ; Stoljar , and directly conflicts with accounts according to which we learn about our sensory experience primarily by directing introspective attention to it e.
He makes his case by wedding the transparency thesis to something like an expressive account of self-ascription: To answer a question about what I want—for example, which flavor ice cream do I want? Similarly for hopes, fears, wishes, intentions, regrets, etc. This manifold compatibility highlights the fact that by itself the transparency thesis does not go far toward a positive view of the mechanisms of self-knowledge.
Moran brings together transparency and self-shaping in his commissive account of self-knowledge. Moran argues that normally when we are prompted to think about what we believe, desire, or intend and he limits his account primarily to these three mental states , we reflect on the outward phenomena in question and make up our minds about what to believe, desire, or do.
Rather than attempting to detect a pre-existing state, we open or re-open the matter and come to a resolution. Since we normally do believe, desire, and intend what we resolve to believe, desire, and do, we can therefore accurately self-ascribe those attitudes. Falvey embraces a similar view, and furthermore joins it with expressivism, a move Moran resists.
See also Falvey ; Boyle ; and see the discussion of the commitment model of self-knowledge in the entry self-knowledge for a more detailed discussion of commissive accounts. Byrne and Dretske bring together transparency and something like a derivational model of self-knowledge—a model on which I derive the conclusion that I believe that P directly from P itself, or the conclusion that I am representing x as F from the fact that x is F —a fact which must of course, to serve as a premise in the derivation, be represented or believed by me.
Byrne argues that just as one might abide by the following epistemic rule:. To determine whether you believe that P , first determine whether P is the case, then follow the rule BEL. Byrne a, b, c, offers similar accounts of self-knowledge of intention, thinking, seeing, and desire. Dretske notes, however, two points of disanalogy between the cases.
In the case of hearing that the mail carrier has arrived by hearing the dog's bark, the conclusion that the mail carrier has arrived is only established if the premise about the dog's barking is true, and furthermore it depends on a defeasible connecting belief, that the dog's barking is a reliable indicator of the mail's arrival. In the introspective case, however, the inference, if it is an inference, does not require the truth of the premise about x 's being F. Even if x is not F , the conclusion that I'm representing x as F is supported.
Nor does there seem to be any sort of defeasible connecting belief. In his book, Tye develops a view like Dretske's, analogizing introspection to displaced perception, though Tye unlike Dretske explicitly denies that inference is involved, instead proposing a mechanism similar to the sort of mechanism envisioned by simple monitoring accounts like those of Nichols and Stich ; see Section 2. The key difference between Tye's account on the one hand and the Nichols and Stich account on the other that warrants the classification of Tye's view here rather than in the section on self-detection models is this: Tye rejects the idea that the process is one of internal detection, while Nichols and Stich stress that idea.
Several authors have challenged the idea that sensory experience necessarily eludes attention—that is, they have denied the central claim of transparency theories about sensory experience. Block , Kind , and Smith have argued that phosphenes—those little lights you see when you press on your eyes—and visual blurriness are aspects of sensory experiences that can be directly attended.
Siewert has argued that what's intuitively appealing in the transparency view is primarily the observation that in reflecting on sensory experience one does not withdraw attention from the objects sensed; but, he argues, this is compatible with also devoting a certain sort of attention to the sensory experience itself.
If non-sensory forms of attention are possible, then the transparency thesis for sensory experience will require restatement: Is it only sensory attention to sensory experience that is impossible? Or is it any kind of attention whatsoever? Simply to say we don't attend sensorily to our mental states is to make only a modest claim, akin to the claim that we see objects rather than seeing our visual experiences of objects; but to say that we cannot attend to our mental states even intellectually appears extreme.
In light of this, it remains unclear how to cast the transparency intuition to better bring out the core idea that is meant to be conveyed by the slogan that introspecting sensory experience is not a matter of attending to one's own mind. Philosophers discussing self-knowledge often write as if approaches highlighting one of these methods of generating self-ascriptions conflict with approaches that highlight other of these methods, and also as if approaches of this general sort conflict with self-detection approaches Section 2.
While conflicts will certainly exist between different accounts intended to serve as exhaustive approaches to self-knowledge, it is implausible that any one or even any few of these approaches to self-knowledge is exhaustive. Plausibly, all of the non-self-detection approaches described above can lead, at least occasionally, to accurate self-ascriptions. Enthusiasts for another of the models, or for a self-detection model, needn't deny this. Finally, even philosophers concerned about strong or oversimple self-scanning views might wish to grant that the mind can do some sort of tracking of its own present or recently past states—for example, when we trace back a stream of recently past thoughts that presumably can't because past be self-ascribed by self-fulfillment, self-shaping, self-expression, or transparency methods.
Schwitzgebel elevates this pluralism into a kind of negative account of introspection. Introspective judgments, he says, arise from a shifting confluence of many processes, recruited opportunistically, none of which can be called introspection proper. Just as there is no single, unified faculty of poster-taking-in that one employs when trying to take in a poster at a psychological conference or science fair, there is, on Schwitzgebel's view, no single, unified faculty of introspection or one underlying core process.
Instead, the introspector, like the poster-viewer, brings to bear a diverse range of cognitive resources as suits the occasion. However, he says, the process wouldn't be worth calling "introspective" unless the introspector aimed to reach a judgment about her current or very recently past conscious experience, in a way that uses at least some resources specific to the first-person case, and in a way that involves some relatively direct sensitivity to the target state. Philosophers have long made introspective claims about the human mind—or, to speak more cautiously, they've made claims seemingly at least in part introspectively grounded.
Aristotle 3rd c. Mengzi 3rd c. Although a number of early modern philosophers had aimed to initiate the scientific study of the mind, it wasn't until the middle of the 19th century—with the appearance of quantitative introspective methods , especially regarding sensory consciousness—that the study of the mind took shape as a progressive, mathematical, laboratory-based science. How weak a stimulus can still be consciously perceived? What is the mathematical relationship between stimulus intensity and the intensity of the resulting sensation?
The Weber-Fechner law holds that the relationship is logarithmic. Along what dimensions, exactly, can sense experience vary? Although from very early on, psychologists also employed non-introspective methods e. In contrast with the dominant philosophical tradition that has, since Descartes, stressed the special privilege or at least high accuracy of introspective judgments about consciousness see Section 4. Wundt, for example, reportedly did not credit the introspective reports of people with fewer than 50, trials of practice in observing their conscious experience Boring This difference in optimism about untrained introspection may partly reflect differences in the types of judgments foregrounded in the two disciplines.
Early introspective psychologists' theoretical discussions of the nature of introspection were often framed in reaction to skepticism about the scientific viability of introspection, especially the concern that the introspective act interferes with or destroys the mental state or process that is its target. Introspective psychologists tended to react to this concern in one of three ways. Since the scientific observation occurs only after the target process is complete, it does not interfere with that process; but of course the delay between the process and the observation must be as brief as possible to ensure that the process is accurately remembered.
Observation, as Brentano characterizes it, involves dedicating full attention to a phenomenon, with the aim of apprehending it accurately. This dedication of attention necessarily interferes with the process to be observed if the process is a mental one; therefore, he says, inner observation is problematic as a scientific psychological method. Inner perception , in contrast, according to Brentano, does not involve attention to our mental lives and thus does not objectionably disturb them. Brentano concedes that inner perception necessarily lacks the advantages of attentive observation, so he recommends conjoining it with retrospective methods.
Wundt agrees with Comte and Brentano that observation necessarily involves attention and so often interferes with the process to be observed, if that process is an inner, psychological one. To a much greater extent than Brentano, however, Wundt emphasizes the importance to scientific psychology of direct attention to experience, including planful and controlled variation.
Although Wundt sees some value in this retrospective method, he thinks it has two crucial shortcomings: First, one can only work with what one remembers of the process in question—the manipulation of a memory-image cannot discover new elements. And second, foreign elements may be unintentionally introduced through association—one might confuse one's memory of a process with one's memory of another associated process or object. Therefore, Wundt suggests, the science of psychology must depend upon the attentive observation of mental processes as they occur.
He argues that those who think attention necessarily distorts the target mental process are too pessimistic. The experience of seeing red, Wundt claims, is more or less the same whether or not one is attending to the psychological fact that one is experiencing redness. Wundt also suggests that the basic processes of memory, feeling, and volition can be observed systematically and without excessive disruption. Other aspects of our psychology must be approached through non-introspective methods such as the observation of language, mythology, culture, and human and animal development.
Although introspective psychologists were able to build scientific consensus on some issues concerning sense experience—issues such as the limits of sensory perception in various modalities and some of the contours of variation in sensory experience—by the early 20th century it was becoming clear that on many issues consensus was elusive. In the s and s, introspective studies were increasingly marginalized. Although strict behaviorism declined in the s and s, its main replacement, cognitivist functionalism which treats functionally defined internal cognitive processes as central to psychological inquiry , generally continued to share behaviorism's disdain of introspective methods.
Perhaps in accord with transparency views of introspection Section 2. On the other hand, perhaps in tension with transparency views, subjective and objective instructions seem sometimes to differ importantly, especially in cases of known illusion, Gestalt effects such as perceived grouping, stimuli near the limits of perceivability, and the experience of ambiguous figures Boring ; Merikle, Smilek, and Eastwood ; Siewert Other researchers have emphasized introspective methods in the study of imagery Marks ; Kosslyn, Reisbert, and Behrmann and emotion Lambie and Marcel ; Barrett et al.
Beeper methodologies have been developed to facilitate immediate retrospection, especially by Hurlburt , ; Hurlburt and Heavey ; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel and Csikszentmihalyi Larson and Csikszentmihalyi ; Hektner, Schmidt, and Csikszentmihalyi Traditional immediately retrospective methods required the introspective observer in the laboratory somehow to intentionally refrain from introspecting the target experience as it occurs, arguably a difficult task.
Hurlburt and Csikszentmihalyi, in contrast, give participants beepers to wear during ordinary, everyday activity. One paradigm is for researchers to present ambiguous sensory stimuli, holding them constant over an extended period, noting what neural changes correlate with changes in subjective reports of experience. Participants typically say that only one image is visible at a time, with the visible image switching every few seconds.
Another version of the ambiguous sensory stimuli paradigm involves presenting the subject with an ambiguous figure such as the Rubin faces-vase figure:. Using this paradigm, researchers have found neuronal changes both in early visual areas and in later areas, as well as changes in widespread neuronal synchrony, that correspond temporally with subjective reports of flipping between one way and another of seeing the ambiguous figure Kleinschmidt et al.
On some trials, subjects report seeing the stimuli, while on others they don't. In trials in which the subject reports that stimulus was visually experienced, researchers have tended to find higher levels of activity through at least some of the downstream visual pathways as well as spontaneous electrical oscillations near 40 Hz Dehaene et al.
If we report our attitudes by introspecting upon them, then much of survey research is also introspective, though psychologists have not generally explicitly described it as such. As with subjective vs. This would seem to support the observation at the core of transparency theory discussed in Section 2. It's plausible to suppose that people have some sort of privileged access to at least some of their own mental states or processes: You know about your own mind, or at least some aspects of it, in a different way and better than you know about other people's minds, and maybe also in a different way and better than you know about the outside world.
Consider pain. It seems you know your own pains differently and better than you know mine, differently and perhaps better than you know about the coffee cup in your hand. And as one might expect, the different introspective methods do not all align equally well with the different varieties of privilege. Consider the judgment thought, belief, etc.
The judgment that P is infallible just in case, if I make that judgment, it is not possible that P is false. It is indubitable just in case, if I make the judgment, it is not possible for me to doubt the truth of P. It is incorrigible just in case, if I make the judgment, it is not possible for anyone else to show that P is false.
And it is self-intimating if it is not possible for P to be true without my reaching the judgment thought, belief, etc. Note that the direction of implication for the last of these is the reverse of the first three. See Alston for a helpful dissection of these distinctions; all admit of variations and nuance. Also note that some philosophers [e. He also appears to claim that the thought or affirmation that I am in such states is infallibly true.
Historical arguments for indubitability and infallibility have tended to center on intuitive appeals to the apparent impossibility of doubting or going wrong about such matters as whether one is having a thought with a certain content or is experiencing pain or having a visual experience as of seeing red. Recent infallibilists have added to this intuitive appeal structural arguments based on self-fulfillment accounts of introspection or self-knowledge see Section 2.
The intuitive idea behind all these structural arguments is that somehow the self-ascriptive thought or judgment contains the mental state or process self-ascribed: the thought that I am thinking of a pink elephant contains the thought of a pink elephant; the judgment that I am having a visual experience of redness contains the red experience itself. If introspection or self-knowledge involves a causal process from a mental state to an ontologically distinct self-ascription of that state, it appears that, however reliable such a process may generally be, there is inevitably room in principle for interference and error.
Minimally, it seems, stroke, quantum accident, or clever neurosurgery could break otherwise generally reliable relationships between target mental states and the self-ascriptions of those states. Similar considerations apply to self-shaping Section 2. The idea behind incorrigibility, recall, is that no one else could show your self-ascriptions to be false; or we might say, more qualifiedly and a bit differently, that if you arrive at the right kind of self-ascriptive judgment perhaps an introspectively based judgment about a currently ongoing conscious process that survives critical reflection , then no one else, perhaps not even you in the future, aware of this, can rationally hold that judgment to be mistaken.
If I judge that right now I am in severe pain, and I do so as a result of considering introspectively whether I am indeed in such pain as opposed to, say, merely inferring that I am in pain based on outward behavior , and if I pause to think carefully about whether I really am in pain and conclude that I indeed am, then no one else who is aware of this can rationally believe that I'm not in pain, regardless of what my outward behavior might be say, calm and relaxed or what shows up in the course of brain imaging say, no activation in brain centers normally associated with pain.
Incorrigibility does not imply infallibility: I may not actually be in pain, even if no one could show that I'm not. Consequently, incorrigibility is compatible with a broader array of sources of self-knowledge than is infallibility. Neither Rorty nor Dennett, for example, appear to defend incorrigibility by appeal to self-fulfillment accounts of introspection though in both cases, interpreting their positive accounts is difficult.
Causal accounts of self-knowledge may be compatible with incorrigibility if the causal connections underwriting the incorrigible judgments are vastly more trustworthy than judgments obtained without the benefit of this sort of privileged access. Of course, unless one embraces a strict self-fulfillment account, with its attendant infallibilism, one will want to rule out abnormal cases such as quantum accident; hence the need for qualifications. Self-intimating mental states are those such that, if a person or at least a person with the right background capacities has them, she necessarily believes or judges or knows that she does.
Conscious states are often held to be in some sense self-intimating, in that the mere having of them involves, requires, or implies some sort of representation or awareness of those states. Reprint: Authorized Edition. More information about this seller Contact this seller 5.
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My soaring soul. My favorite studies were natural philoso -. Learning was so illumined, that grammar was eclipsed. In connec -. My father's relentless theology emphasized belief in a. My mother, as she bathed my burning temples, bade. The physician marvelled ; and the " hor -. When the meeting was held for the examination of can-. He was apparently as eager to have. Distinctly do I recall what followed. I stoutly main-. This was so earnestly said, that even the oldest church-. In confidence of faith, I could say in David's words,. In the year I was called to preach in Boston at the.
The congregation so increased in number the pews were. Our last vestry meeting was made memorable by elo -. One memorable Sunday afternoon, a soprano, — clear,. It was not an uncommon occurrence in my own church. The charter for The Mother Church in Boston was ob-. Written in youth, while visiting a family friend in the beautiful. And ope their closed cells to the bright, laughing day;. After parting with the dear home circle I went with.
My husband was a freemason, being a member in Saint. Colonel Glover's tender devotion to his young bride. After returning to the paternal roof I lost all my hus -. A few months before my father's second marriage, to. Awoke new beauty in the surge's roll! Star of my earthly hope, babe of my soul. My second marriage was very unfortunate, and from it. My dominant thought in marrying again was to get. After his removal a letter was read to my little son,. Meanwhile he had served as a volunteer throughout.
It is well to know, dear reader, that our material, mortal. The awakening from a false sense of life, substance, and. Mere historic incidents and personal events are frivo -. The Gospel narratives bear brief testimony even to the. It may be that the mortal life-battle still wages, and. As these pungent lessons became clearer, they grew. Thus it was when the moment arrived of the heart's. My immediate recovery from the effects of an injury.
Even to the homoeopathic physician who attended me,. I then withdrew from society about three years, — to. The Bible was my textbook. It answered my questions. I named it Christian , because it is compassionate,. God I characterized as individ -. I knew the human conception of God to be that He was. I beheld with ineffable awe our great Master's purpose. Our great Way-shower, steadfast to the end in his obedi -.
The miracles recorded in the Bible, which had before. Jesus of Nazareth was a natural and divine Scientist. I wrote also, at this period, comments on the Scriptures,. If these notes and comments, which have never been. Up to that time I had not fully voiced my discov -. As sweet music ripples in one's first thoughts of it like. The divine hand led me into a new world of light and. I had learned that thought must be spiritualized, in.
I had learned that Mind reconstructed the body, and. Am I a believer in spiritualism? I believe in no ism. The motive of my earliest labors has never changed. It is often asked why Christian Science was revealed to. Why was. The answer is plain. Paul declared that the law. The loss of material objects of affection sunders the. The abso -. From my very childhood I was impelled, by a hunger. The first spon -. As says St. James: "Whosoever shall keep. Into mortal mind's material obliquity I gazed, and stood.
Early had I learned that whatever is loved materially,. What is termed mortal and material existence is graph-. I wandered through the dim mazes of materia medica ,. I found, in the two hundred and sixty-two remedies. The drug disappears in the higher attenua -. The mental virtues of the material methods of medicine,. I claim for healing scientifically the following advan -. Second: It is more effec -. The truths of Christian Science are not interpolations. Though a man were girt with the Urim and Thummim. Five years after taking out my first copyright, I taught.
This will account for certain pub-. When it was first printed, the critics took pleasure in. The first edition numbered one thousand copies. Those who formerly sneered at it, as foolish and ec -. Even the Scriptures gave no direct interpretation of the. My reluctance to give the public, in my first edition of. After months had passed, I yielded to a constant con-. Science and Health is the textbook of Christian Science.
Retrospection and Introspection/Works
When the demand for this book increased, and people. At one time I was called to speak before the Lyceum. The physicians had given up the case and retired. This scientific demonstration so stirred the doctors and. Many were the desperate cases I instantly healed,. He was remark-.
More Books by Mary Baker Eddy
My husband, Asa G. Eddy, taught two terms in my. The first Christian Scientist Association was organized. When I was its pastor, and in the pulpit every Sunday,. Examining the situation prayerfully and carefully, noting. This measure was immediately followed by a great re-.
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The history of that hour holds this true record. Despite the prosperity of my church, it was learned. From careful observation and experience came my clue. I also saw that. Lines penned when I was pastor of the Church of Christ, Scien -. Lab'ring long and lone,. And Thou know'st Thine own. Take them in Thine arms;. In view of all this, a meeting was called of the Board. A Primary class student, richly imbued with the spirit.
After hav -. The Massachusetts Metaphysical College drew its. At a special meeting of the Board of the Metaphysical. Whereas, The Massachusetts Metaphysical College,. Whereas, The material organization was, in the beginning. Whereas, Other institutions for instruction in Christian. Whereas, The fundamental principle for growth in Chris-. Whereas, Mortals must learn to lose their estimate. Resolved , That we thank the State for its charter, which is. After due deliberation and earnest discussion it was unani -.
When God impelled me to set a price on my instruction. God has since shown me, in multitudinous ways, the. Loyal students speak with delight of their pupilage,. I see clearly that students in Christian Science should,. In December, , I gave a lot of land in Boston to my.
To meet the broader wants of humanity, and provide. The first official organ of the Christian Scientist Asso -. I started. To the National Christian Scientist Association, at its. Because faith is belief, and not under-. Millions are believing in God, or good, without bearing. Blind belief cannot say with the. The work of healing, in the Science of Mind, is the most.
Let us follow the example of Jesus, the master Meta-. Whatever diverges from the one divine Mind, or God,. War is waged between the evidences of Spirit and the. All consciousness is Mind, and Mind is God. Neither ancient nor modern philosophy furnishes a. This would be like correcting the prin -. Prin -. Soul is right;. Man shines by borrowed light. He reflects God as. Evil, or error, is not Mind; but infinite Mind is sufficient. All must be of God, and not our own, sepa -.
Human systems of philosophy and religion are depart-. Mistaking divine Principle. Stating the divine Principle, omnipotence omnis potens ,. With our Master, life was not merely a sense of exist-. In Science, Life is not temporal, but eternal, without. Christian Science reveals Mind, the only living and true. Science reveals Spirit as All, averring. Christian Science reveals God and His idea as the All. Christian Science saith. Science saith to all manner of disease, "Know that God. Him;" and the sick are healed. Material sense saith ,. Christian Science is the only sure basis of harmony.
Christian Science declares that sickness is a belief, a. Science saith to fear, "You are the cause of all sick-. God is everywhere. Christian Science reveals the fact that, if suffering exists,. If you rule out every sense of disease and suffering from. Posterity will have the right to demand that Christian. Unless this method be pur -. Test Christian Science by its effect on society, and you. God is good, hence goodness is something, for it rep-. Augustine once said, "The devil is but the ape of. Sin ultimates in sinner, and in this sense they are one.
In Christian Science the fact is made obvious that the. Since there is in belief an illusion termed sin, which. If evangelical churches refuse fellowship with the. Ritualism and dogma lead to self-righteousness and. Pharisa -. The odors of persecution,. The Jewish religion was not spiritual; hence Jesus.
Truth, casting out evils and healing the sick; Love, ful -. As well expect to determine, without a telescope, the. Christian Science gives vitality to religion, which is no. Sin is both concrete and abstract. Sin was, and is , the. The finite was self-arrayed against the infinite,. Silencing self, alias rising above corporeal personality,. The sinner created neither himself nor sin, but sin. In the words. This mortal material concept was never a creator, al-. Our Master instructed his students to "call no man. Science and Health, the textbook of Christian Science,.
The beautiful, good,. Art thou dwelling in the be-. Ignorant of the origin and operations of mortal mind, —. We do not question the authenticity of the Scriptural. No person can take the individual place of the Virgin. The second appearing of Jesus is, unquestionably, the. And the scientific ultimate of this God-idea must be,. The right teacher of Christian Science lives the truth he. Such a post of duty, unpierced by vanity, exalts a mortal. It is not the forager on others' wis -. Great temptations beset an ignorant or an unprincipled.
Sinister and selfish motives entering into mental practice. These are the tares grow-. Secret mental efforts to obtain help from one who is. In the practice of Christian Science one cannot impart. The Psalmist vividly portrays the result of secret faults,. Physical personality is finite; but. Limitations are put off in proportion as the fleshly.
This great fact leads into profound depths. The mate-. From that hour personal corporeality became less to. He who clings to personality, or perpetually warns you. He who does this is ignorant of the meaning of the word. My own corporeal personality afflicteth me not wittingly;. Why withhold my name, while appropriating my lan -.
Life and its ideals are inseparable, and one's writings. If one's spiritual ideal is comprehended and loved, the. It is proverbial that dishonesty retards spiritual growth. God's law of manright. A student can write volumi -. Thoughts touched with the Spirit and Word of Christian. The spiritually minded meet on the stairs which lead up. This just affec -. He who gains the God-crowned summit of Christian. I have long remained silent on a growing evil in plagi -.
Pope was right in saying, "An. In healing and. I recommend students not to read so-called scientific. The rules of Mind-healing are wholly Christlike and. Not by the hearing of the ear is spiritual truth learned. We glean spiritual harvests from our. The signs for the wayfarer in divine Science lie in meek-. Dishonesty, envy, and mad ambition are "lusts of the. If beset with mis -. Be temperate in thought, word, and deed.
Restrain untempered zeal. We recognize this kingdom, the reign of harmony. For whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth ,. And scourgeth every son whom He receiveth. As the poets in different languages have expressed it: —. Though the divine rebuke is effectual to the pulling. If the Christian Scientist. The kindly shepherd of the East carries his lambs in his. There are no greater miracles known to earth than per-. We love our friends,. Nothing except sin, in the students themselves, can. The letter of the law of God, separated from its spirit,. After the supreme advent of Truth in the heart, there.
A realization of the shifting scenes of human happiness,. A general rule is, that my students should not allow their. The widest power and strongest growth have always. At this period my students should locate in large cities,. It is often asked which revision of Science and Health is. Students whom I have taught are seldom benefited by. Also, they are prepared to receive the infinite. The student may mistake in his conception of Truth, and. Christian Scientists should take their textbook into the. That these essential points are ever omitted, is anoma -.
Centuries will intervene before the statement of the inex -. The teacher himself should continue to study this text-. He who sees clearly and enlightens other minds most. The opinions of men cannot be substituted for God's. That teacher does most for his students who divests him-. The less the teacher personally controls other minds, and.
A teacher should take charge only of his own pupils and. Teachers of Christian Science will find it advisable to. Of this also rest assured, that books and teaching are but. Guard yourselves against the subtly hidden suggestion. Seek to occupy no position whereto you do not feel. The tempter is vigilant, awaiting only an opportunity. There is but one way of. Art thou still unacquainted with thyself?
Then be in-. A student desiring growth in the knowledge of Truth,. The poet's line, "Order is heaven's first law," is so eter -. Experience has taught me that the rules of Christian. Genuine Christian Scien -. First: Christian Scientists are to "heal the sick" as the. In so doing they must follow the divine order as pre-. In this orderly, scientific dispensation healers become a.
It is already understood that Christian Scientists will. Second: Another command of the Christ, his prime. He lifted his own body from the sepulchre. In him, Truth. The spiritual significance of this command, "Raise the. It implies such an eleva -. Third: This leads inevitably to a consideration of an-. This evangelistic duty should not be so warped as to. Itinerancy should not be. In those days preaching and teaching were substantially. Men assembled in the one temple at Jeru -. Jesus' method was to instruct his own students; and he. Above all, trespass not intentionally upon other people's.
Does the faithful shepherd forsake the lambs, — retain-. The true mother never willingly neglects her children. One of my students wrote to me: "I believe the proper. The parable of "the prodigal son" is rightly called "the. Where did Jesus deliver this great lesson — or, rather,.
On a hillside, near the sloping shores of the Lake of Gali -. In this simplicity, and with such fidelity, we see Jesus. What has this hillside priest, this seaside teacher, done.